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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three chapters of economic analyses on social interaction,
which mainly cover the topics of users’ online interaction and cross-cultural interaction
in multicultural societies.
Chapter 1 studies users’ online interaction. Friend-based social media users create
their own content and browse their friends’ creating content with advertisements sent
by the social media owner. Only users admitting friendships can interact; their interac-
tion is associated with intrapersonal and asymmetrical interpersonal externalities cross
the dual activities. This chapter considers the social media owner as a monopolist dis-
criminating users by sending different quantities of advertisements to the users while
they are browsing. More generally, the monopolist can subsidize users’ creating and
prices their browsing. The pricing browsing plan depends on users’ degree centrali-
ties; the pricing and subsidizing plan depends on users’ Katz-Bonacich centralities of
degree two. The owner benefits from denser networks and intrapersonal externalities
increasing.
Chapter 2 studies cross-cultural interaction. In this chapter, the acculturation game
is proposed to study the cultural learning behavior of individuals from minority groups
in the acculturation process, by which the individuals integrate themselves into a mul-
ticultural society. In the game, agents are endowed with certain levels of cultural
knowledge of the society; the agents acquire cultural knowledge to improve their abil-
ity to coordinate with each other, but experience difficulties or/and acculturative stress
in order to learn. With difficulties in learning only, the agents endowed with low lev-
els of cultural knowledge learn while those endowed with high levels do not; and the
opposite is true for agents who experience only acculturative stress. The presence of
both difficulties in learning and stress leads to a ‘double-threshold strategy’, where the
agents endowed with low and high levels of cultural knowledge do not learn, while
the agents endowed with middle levels learn. Many countries impose the tests of lan-
guage, culture and history for candidates in acquiring citizenship. We show that this
policy improves social welfare in most cases; if the policy does not improve social
welfare, agents experience high levels of stress in learning.
ii
Chapter 3 extends the acculturation game with considering heterogeneous marginal
costs. The heterogeneous marginal cost function increases with the distances from the
cultural knowledge level agents trying to acquire to their endowed cultural knowledge
levels. The results show that the shape of equilibrium depends on the population den-
sity distribution over agents’ endowed cultural knowledge levels: if the distribution
is “flat”, the equilibrium strategy increases with agents’ endowed cultural knowledge
levels; if the distribution peaks at some intervals, then agents, whose endowed cultural
knowledge levels are at the intervals and the right neighbourhood of the intervals, con-
form to expand to the same level of cultural knowledge. The social welfare increasing
from adaptation is independent of the density distribution function if the equilibrium
strategy is strictly increasing. An equilibrium strategy with agents conforming to ex-
pand to the same level does not necessarily cause gains or loss of the social welfare
from adaptation; we show with an example that the social welfare from adaptation
decreases with the population density distribution over the agents with high endowed
cultural knowledge levels.
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Chapter 1
Pricing Asymmetrical Network Effects on Social Media
1.1 Introduction
Network externalities are the key determinants to users’ online behavior. Friend-based
social media, such as Facebook and WeChat, are internet platforms where friends and
acquaintances share their personal life events with each other. The authentic identity,
innovative ways of social interaction exhibited on friend-based social media platforms,
and associated social network externalities led to their rapid growth and commercial
success.1 The goal of this paper is to study how the platform owners price users by
sending different quantities of advertisements to the users. Users’ dual activities-
content creating and content borrowing display the asymmetric interpersonal effects
and intrapersonal effects across the two activities on friend-based social media. There-
fore, how will these network effects determine the platform owners’ pricing strategy
or pricing and subsidizing strategy?
Content creating and browsing are users’ basic online behaviors. In friend-based
social media context, a user’s creating behavior includes creating her/his profile, up-
dating her/his statuses, posting photos/videos, sharing articles/news and reacting to
her/his friends’ posting with a “like”, “comment”, or “share”. A user’s creating con-
tent can be seen by her/his friends. However, a user’s browsing behavior is private
1For the innovative ways, Joinson (2008) identifies the 7 unique usages and gratification of users
on Facebook, which includes social connection, shared identities, content, social investigation, social
network surfing, and status updating.
For the growth and success of Facebook, Facebook was founded in 2004 and had its IPO in May
2012. Facebook was ranked as 5th largest internet company in the world by market value with 2.3
billion monthly active users in 2018 (Wikipedia (2019), Seth (2018) and Facebook (2019)). For the
case of WeChat, it was launched in 2011, which is owned by one of the largest internet companies
Tencent in China.WeChat had 1.1 billion monthly active users all over the world in 2018 (Tencent
Holdings Limited (2019)).
1
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information to herself/himself, which means it can not be seen by her/his friends or
any other user on social media; and a user’s browsing behavior includes browsing
her/his friends’ posts, and browsing the reactions to her/his own posts and those to
her/his friends’.
The privacy of browsing behavior on friend-based social media is a unique design
among online social media.2 The reason for this particular design of platforms could
be that: users use their authentic identities on friend-based social media, and the ma-
jority of one user’s friends know or at least meet the user in real life.3 Revealing a
user’s friends’ and her/his acquaintances’ browsing behavior might have some nega-
tive repercussions. For example, a new friend of a user might not want to know more
about him/her by searching his/her posting, if the friend’s browsing information is re-
vealed to the user. This is due to the fact that the friend might concern that her/his
particular attention shown on the user causes over-interpretation or misunderstanding,
which affects their real-life interaction. Thus, friend-based social media owners do not
reveal the browsing behavior information on the platforms to make users unaware of
being searched or feel free to search other users on the platforms.
Two effects appear in users’ dual-activity interaction on friend-based social media
by their unique design. One of these two effects is an asymmetric interpersonal cross-
activity externality. It arises since users spend more time on browsing, if their friends
post more content; and the interpersonal externality is asymmetric since users’ private
browsing behavior has no direct impact on any user’s creating.4 The evidence of inter-
personal cross-activity externality is from an empirical study by Joinson (2008), who
states that users spend time on social media because of the content on it.
The other effect is intrapersonal cross-activity externalities. Each user’s dual ac-
tivities could be substitutes due to time constraints; they could also be complements
since: (i) users react to their friends’ posts after browsing, and (ii) users check their
2On other widely used social media without asking for authentic identities except for celebrities,
such as Quora, Twitter, and Weibo, users can observe the number of times their created content being
watched.
3Facebook asks its users to register with their authentic names; for WeChat, not only WeChat verify
the ID numbers of users to use their associated payment system, but also users can add each other as
friends conditioning on that they share their account numbers with each other (Graziani (2017) and
WeChat Help Center (2019)). It is more demanding for two users to have real-life interaction to become
friends on WeChat than on Facebook.
4A user’s browsing behavior has an indirect impact on her/his friends’ creating behavior due to the
intrapersonal externality. For more details, please see the remaining of this paragraph and the model in
Section 1.2.
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social media homepages more often after posting. Aggregately, the two types of in-
trapersonal effects, which are the substitute and complementary effects of each user’s
dual activities, might neutralize each other, or one type of effects dominates the other.
The empirical evidence of different types of intrapersonal cross-activity externalities
is from Viswanath et al. (2009), who find that users’ frequencies of interaction with
their friends are different. Note that we may use “intrapersonal externalities” or “in-
trapersonal effects” for short interchangeably with “intrapersonal cross-activity exter-
nalities” in the following discussion.
Social media owners provide their users with the information service, with which
the users can interact with their friends online; meanwhile, the owners “price” their
users by posting advertisements to the users while they are browsing. The friend-
based social media owners act as monopolists in their markets due to the legislative
barriers and huge social network externalities of existing users;5 they also have all the
social network information of users in such a way that they can deliver the users cre-
ated content to their friends only. footnoteSeveral empirical studies, e.g., Viswanath
et al. (2009), Schneider et al. (2009), collected their network information data on so-
cial media platform by themselves by using computer programs such as “crawler”.
Therefore, we can also infer that the social media owner has all the social network
information.
There are some maturing business tactics for subsidizing content generation on
friend-based social media. For example, users receive discounts or electronic money
by sharing their consumption information of certain products on friend-based social
media. Some of the subsidized contents are not pure advertisements, as friends can
also receive discounts or electronic money by clicking the subsidized content. For ex-
ample, there are popular online games developed and published by social media based
firms (Web Desk (2018)). footnoteFor example, Facebook has popular game “Candy
Crush” (Kafka (2014)); and WeChat’s owner Tencent has PvP game “Honor of Kings”
(Webster (2017)). Players, who are also friend-based social media users, share their
gaming activities on friend-based social media to gain electronic money of the game,
and their friends could also receive electronic money by clicking the content. However,
5Chinese government banned Facebook’s access to Chinese market in 2009 (Pham (2016)). Tencent
operates WeChat on international markets, however, there is no updating information of the total number
of monthly active users on international markets since 2013, when WeChat had 1 million monthly active
users on the international market (Iqbal (2017)).
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there might be more advertisements on the web pages linked to the subsidized content.
In such ways, the friends derive utilities from watching the subsidized content, and the
monopolist could send more advertisements to her/his users. In this paper, we assume
that users would like to gain the electronic money in the games and focus on users’
behavior on friend-based social media only. The research question is: will the social
media owners discriminate users by their network information and how?
We analyze a social media owner’s pricing discriminating plan across connected
users in our stylized model of social media through a game-theoretical approach. In
the model, users choose time spending on two interdependent activities-creating and
browsing activities. The interaction of users’ dual activities is associated with an asym-
metrical interpersonal cross-activity externality and intrapersonal cross-activity exter-
nalities on friend-based social media. The goal is to understand if network information
is valuable to the social media owner as a monopolist. In particular, we want to under-
stand the role of the three types of intrapersonal externalities. Further, we consider a
more general setting, where the monopolist can subsidize users’ creating behavior and
price their browsing behavior.
In comparative static studies, we analyze the effects of denser networks and in-
crease of intrapersonal cross-activity externalities on the monopolist’s profit, and we
analyze how users’ utilities depend on the intrapersonal externalities. The two stud-
ies correspond to two operational ways of social media owners: (i) building denser
networks corresponds to the owner’s service of recommending new friends to users;
and (ii) raising intrapersonal externalities corresponds to that both social media owners
and users are trying to improve the ways of online interaction by developing stickers
and GIF online, such that users have higher willingness to express their feelings after
browsing on social media.
We show the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. If the monop-
olist prices only users’ browsing behavior, the pricing plan for each user is linear in
the user’s weighted degree centrality and the intrapersonal externalities. In the cases
where the monopolist both prices users’ browsing and subsidizes their creating with-
out the intrapersonal effects, the pricing and subsidizing plan for each user depends
on a new network measure: Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2.6 We are able to
6If there exist intrapersonal externalities, then the monopolist’s plan and users’ behavior are related
to the users’ quasi-Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2, shown at Section 1.7.3. Please see the Sec-
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use a simply way to show how Katz-Bonacich centrality and Katz-Bonacich central-
ity of degree 2 are related. Moreover, we show that nodes’ ranking of Katz-Bonacich
centrality in a given undirected network are not necessarily preserved in that of Katz-
Bonacich centrality of degree 2. In comparative static studies, the results show that
the monopolist’s profit increases with new links added to the existing network in most
cases, and that both users’ utilities and the monopolist’s profit increase with intraper-
sonal cross-activity externalities. Furthermore, the monopolist prefers networks with
more diverse degree distributions.
Some empirical studies investigate users’ behaviors on social media. Benevenuto
et al. (2009) and Schneider et al. (2009) show that users spend most of their time on
browsing, not on creating on social media. Lewis et al. (2008) show that a user with
a higher degree or centrality would be more active on social media. Joinson (2008)
identifies content, status updating, social network investigation, surfing and other three
uses as the unique uses and gratifications for users on Facebook.
A strand of literature concerns players’ local network interaction with a setting
where players’ best replies are linear in the sum of their neighbors’ actions. The largest
eigenvalues of adjacency matrices of networks determine users’ equilibrium strategy
in the game of complements (e.g., Ballester et al. (2006) and Corbo et al. (2007));
the smallest eigenvalues of those do in the game of substitutes (e.g., Bramoulle´ et al.
(2014)). The largest and the smallest eigenvalues are still central in our analysis.
The relevant works on the monopolist’s pricing on social networks are Candogan
et al. (2012) and Bloch and Que´rou (2013). In their models, players have only one
action with a symmetric local network externality. Their studies show that the price is
uniform in undirected networks.7 Candogan et al. (2012) also study the case in which
the monopolist discriminate consumers with a full price and a discount price, and they
find it is NP-hard. Moreover, Zhou and Chen (2018) study monopolist’s dynamic
pricing of social goods on network, and they show that the monopolist can gain more
profit if she/he offers sequentially to the customers of certain groups. For a summary
and further discussion of this strand literature, please see Bloch (2016).
For the analysis of multiple activities on networks, Chen et al. (2018b) study the
tion 1.7.1 for more information about Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 and quasi-Katz-Bonacich
centrality of degree 2.
7In Candogan et al. (2012)’s model, the price is uniform when valuation is the same for all con-
sumers.
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case where connected players experience the interpersonal externality of each of their
multiple activities. Gagnon and Goyal (2017) are interested in explaining the interac-
tion between the market and social ties. In their case, players choose a market action
and a network action.
The most relevant studies on pricing multiple activities consider cases with dif-
ferent numbers of pricing firms and different types of interpersonal and intrapersonal
externalities. We clarify some terms of interpersonal effects to facilitate following dis-
cussion on relevant literature. The interpersonal effects are of two types. We name
the first one as the interpersonal externality within each activity, which is studied by
Chen et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2018a), and Chen et al. (2018b). The externality is
interpersonal but within each activity. The other one is interpersonal effects across
two activities, which is what we study in this paper. In Chen et al. (2015), Chen et al.
(2018a) and Chen et al. (2018b)’s papers, the terms which captures the interpersonal
effect in user’s utility function is ti
∑
j∈N(i) tj and vi
∑
j∈N(i) vj in which ti and vi de-
note player i’s two activities respectively andN(i) denotes the set of players who have
a link to user i. For a real life example, consider teenagers’ allocation of time between
studying and watching TV. Teenagers spend more time on studying if their friends do,
and they also spend more time on watching TV if their friends watch more; it is not
cross activity, since the teenagers do not spend more time on studying if their friends
spend more time on watching TV. For the interpersonal cross-activity externality, the
interpersonal effect is denoted by vi
∑
j∈N(i) tj . The example is the case studied in this
chapter: users spend more time on browsing if their friends’ total time spending on
creating increases. The interpersonal cross-activity externality is symmetrical if each
behavior has the same local network effects on the other, for example social media,
such as Weibo, Twitter and Quora etc, reveal the users’ browsing information.
Chen et al. (2018a) consider the users’ dual activities on two platforms with inter-
personal externalities within each activity and intrapersonal substitutes cross two ac-
tivities. Their study show that the pricing plan is network-dependent and the more cen-
tral users are priced less than other users. However, their study shows that the duopoly
competition is essential to derive the network-dependent pricing plan; in the monop-
olist’s cases, the pricing plan collapses to uniform pricing as in Bloch and Que´rou
(2013) and Candogan et al. (2012)’s cases. We are able to show that the interpersonal
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asymmetric across dual activities preserves the network-dependent pricing plan in mo-
nopolist’s cases. We will make a more comprehensive comparison between our results
and Chen et al. (2018b) in Section 1.4.
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016), Leduc et al. (2017), Ushchev and Zenou (2018),
Shin (2017), Sa¨a¨skilahti (2007), and Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) study price prob-
lems with local network externalities in different specific settings. Also, this chapter
enriches platform competition literature (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Sa-
loner (1985), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Armstrong
(2006))by considering the local network externalities between the participants from
one side (user side)of the platforms.
This chapter unfolds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model. Section 1.3
solves the equilibria of monopolist’s pricing plan on browsing. Section 1.4 studies the
monopolist’s dual activity pricing and subsidizing plan. The comparative static studies
are in Section 1.5. In detail, Section 1.5.1 analyzes the effect of network structure on
the monopolist’s profit and on users’ behavior; Section 1.5.2 examines the intraper-
sonal effect on users’ utilities and on the monopolist’s profit. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Consider a set of users N connected in a network G, such that G is an undirected
and unweighted |N | × |N | adjacency matrix which states the connectedness of the
network. For all i, j ∈ N , gij denotes the entry in row i and column j of matrix G,
such that: (i) for all i 6= j ∈ N , gij = gji = 1 if user i and user j are connected as
friends, otherwise, gij = gji = 0; (ii) for all i ∈ N , gii = 0. We abuse notation by
using N(i) = {j ∈ N | gij = 1} to denote i’s friends on the network, and we assume
that every user i has at least one friend in network G such that for all i, |N (i) | ≥ 1.
User i chooses both the time spending on creating content ti and that on brows-
ing/viewing content vi such that (ti, vi) ∈ R2+. The monopolist chooses an advertise-
ment plan pi for user i; pi is the quantity of advertisements sent to user i per unit time.
Let pT =
(
p1, p2, ..., p|N |
) ∈ R|N |+ denote the monopolist’s pricing plan for all users,
The game is a two-stage extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous
moves. The timing of events is: at the first stage, the monopolist chooses the pricing
plan pT ; for all i ∈ N , user i chooses the time to create ti and the time to browse vi
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simultaneously at the second stage.
Let vector t−i ∈ R|N |−1+ and v−i ∈ R|N |−1+ denote profiles of time spending on
creating and browsing of all users except for user i. The utility function of user i is
defined as follows:8
U ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi) =
αiti − 1
2
βt2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Creating Utilities
+
Interpersonal Externality︷ ︸︸ ︷
vi
∑
j∈N(i)
tj −ηpivi − 1
2
βv2i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Browsing Utilities
+
Intrapersonal Externality︷︸︸︷
γtivi , (1.1)
in which αi, β > 0, and β > |γ|. Eq. (1.1) captures the utilities user i deriving
from spending time on creating and browsing with the intrapersonal cross-activity ex-
ternality. Before we explain each term in details in the following paragraphs, please
note that what factor we include in user i’s utility function should be information that
i can have from the platforms. In other words, readers may infer some other exter-
nalities embedded in users’ interaction, however, they should not be included in the
utility functions if the information of one party incurring externalities are not revealed
to users on these platforms.
 Create original content. Linear-quadratic term αiti − βt2i /2 denotes the util-
ities user i derives by spending time ti on creating irrespective of the intrapersonal
externalities. Parameter αi is user i marginal benefits of spending time on creating,
which captures all the exogenous factors boosting i’s original creating willingness.
The quadratic term −βt2i /2 captures i’s diminishing return in creating activity on so-
cial media. We name β as the index of rate of diminishing return.
 Browsing friends’ created content. Users browse the content available on social
media, however, their browsing behavior is discouraged by the advertisements on the
web pages of social media website. For the first term vi
∑
j∈N(i) tj in browsing utilities,
the sum of her/his friends’ time spent on creating content
∑
j∈N(i) tj can be interpreted
as the content available to user i, which is the marginal benefits of user i spending
time on browsing. The second term −ηpivi captures user i’s disutilities of watching
advertisements on social media, in which pi represents the quantity of advertisements
8The linear-quadratic utility function of each user is essential to derive the results of this paper. It is
not robust to other forms of users’ utility functions.
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sent to user i per unit time, such that pivi is the total advertisements user i watches
while she/he is browsing, and η > 0 captures the users’ intolerance to advertisements.
The third term −βv2i /2 captures i’s diminishing return in browsing activity on social
media.
 Intrapersonal effects: the aggregate of intrapersonal substitutes and com-
plementarities.
• The intrapersonal effects γtivi can be rewritten as −βtivi + (γ + β) tivi.
• Adding the first term −βtivi to the sum of diminishing return terms −βt2i /2
and −βv2i /2, we have term −β (ti + vi)2 /2, which denotes the diminishing re-
turn of user i by spending time on the platforms. Therefore, −βtivi captures
the intrapersonal substituting effects cross user i’s dual activities due to time
constraints.
• Term (β + γ) tivi such that β + γ > 0 captures the complementary intraper-
sonal effect between i’s browsing behavior and her/his reaction to the post. The
complementary intrapersonal effect (β + γ) tivi combined with the asymmetric
interpersonal cross-activity externalities vi
∑
j∈N(i) tj constitutes the pattern of
users’ interaction online. Consider two users i, j on the network who are con-
nected as friends such that j ∈ N (i). Users i and j’s interaction is as follows:
user i posts content such that ti increases; friend j browse i’s post such that vj
increases (by vj
∑
k∈N(j) tk and i ∈ N (j)); friend j comment on i’s post after
browsing such that tj increases (by (β + γ) tjvj); and i browses j’s comment
and replies to it such that vi increases and ti increases ( by vi
∑
k∈N(i) tk with
j ∈ N (i) and (β + γ) tivi),....and so on so forth. Note that the browsing behav-
ior of user j has indirectly effects on her/his friend i’s creating behavior though
the process of commenting and replying interaction on the platform.
• Aggregately, the substitute effect due to time constraints−βtivi in β (ti + vi)2 /2
cancels out the term βtivi in the complementary effect (β + γ) tivi, and we have
the intrapersonal effects/externalities denoted as γtivi. If γ = 0, the substitute
and complementary intrapersonal effects cancel each other out; if γ < 0, the
substitute effect dominates the complementary effect; and the complementary
effect dominates the substitute effect, if γ > 0. Further, we assume that |γ| < β,
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such that utility function U is strictly concave and has a unique maximum point
with a negative definite Hessian matrix.
 Monopolist’s pricing plan. The monopolist gains profit from advertisers by the
times users watching the advertisers’ advertisements. Assume that the advertisers’ de-
mand to reach every user on social media is high enough. Then, all advertisement
spaces on social media can be sold. Without loss of generality, each advertisement
space is assumed to be sold at $1, which is the opportunity cost of outside advertise-
ment sponsoring options. Let vT =
(
v1, v2, ..., v|N |
) ∈ R|N |+ denote the profile of all
users’ time spending on browsing. Then, the monopolist’s profit function is pi = pTv.
Several remarks of the model are made below:
(i) As we mentioned in introduction, Facebook and WeChat do not reveal users’
browsing time to their friends to make users unaware of being searched and to
make them feel free to search other users. Therefore, the other users’ browsing
time spending v−i is not included in the expression of eq. (1.1). Moreover,
user i can infer that her/his friend j browsed i’s content if j commented on i’s
posting, and it is captured by the intrapersonal effects. See the third paragraph
of intrapersonal effect above for detailed explanations.
(ii) The social media owner does not reveal users’ browsing information (v) to their
friends. However, users know how many friends they have (G) on friend-based
social media. The more friends a user has, the more the user will create. The
users’ degrees str network-dependent and exogenous; therefore, the degree ef-
fect of users on their creating is captured by αi. The other network-independent
factors captured by αi contain users’ personalities, chances of events in daily
life etc.
(iii) if η = 1 and γ = 0, the terms depending on vi in the utility function are(∑
j∈N(i) tj − pi
)
vi − βv2i /2. As
∑
j∈N(i) tj is the total content available for i,
readers may think that pi should be interpreted as the total advertisements seen
by user i; user i spends no time on browsing, if the total content available is
equal to the total advertisements
∑
j∈N(i) tj = pi. This statement makes an as-
sumption that user i’s utility function corresponds to browsing advertisements
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and browsing content in the same way, which is not the case here.9
1.3 Subgame-perfect Equilibria
We choose subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) as the solution concept for the game,
which is an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves (which
is also used by Bloch and Que´rou (2013) and Chen et al. (2018a)). The game can
be solved by backward induction. Given the monopolist’s pricing plan, we solve the
strategy of users’ dual activities at the second stage. Then, the monopolist’s optimal
pricing strategy will be determined.
We start with the simplest case γ = 0. In equilibrium, a user’ creating time depends
on the her/his own willingness to create, and the user’s browsing time depends on
her/his friends’ creating. The results show the monopolist’s pricing plan for each user
is proportional to his/her degree. Then, we study general cases where γ 6= 0. The
intrapersonal externality has no network-dependent effect on the monopolist’s pricing
plan, but induces each user’s activities having global effects on the social network and
both of the user’s dual activities depending her/his Katz-Bonacich centrality.
1.3.1 Asymmetric Interpersonal Effects Only
If γ = 0, the utility function is given byU ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi) = αiti+vi
∑
j∈N(i) tj−
β (t2i + v
2
i ) /2−pivi. We solve each user’s utility maximization problem, then we solve
the equilibrium given each user’s best respond in the game.
Maximize U w.r.t ti and vi by deriving U ’s F.O.C.s:
ti =
αi
β
and
vi =

∑
j∈N(i) tj/β − ηpi/β
0
∑
j∈N(i) tj > ηpi∑
j∈N(i) tj ≤ ηpi
. (1.2)
9If this is the case, the utility function is vi
∑
j∈N(i) tj − βv2i /2− η (pivi) vi in which pi is still the
density of advertisements for user i. The best response would be v∗i =
∑
j∈N(i) tj/ (β + 2ηpi). The
monopolist’s profit from i piv∗i strictly increases with pi ∈ [0,+∞), which is not sound. Moreover, if
we use pi to denote the total advertisements sent to i, then the monopolist profit is pT1. The monopolist
can choose a pi slightly smaller than
∑
j∈N(i) tj , and she/he gains all the profit from advertisements on
the website, which is not sound neither.
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User i’s optimal creating time ti and browsing time vi are independent.
Consider eq. (1.2). If pi is less than
∑
j∈N(i) tj/η, vi is positive and is proportional
to the difference between her/his friends’ sum of creating time and the density of ad-
vertisements sent to her/him; otherwise, vi is at its lower bound 0. The second case
where vi = 0 driven by a high pi will not appear, since the monopolist has no incentive
to choose a pi ≥
∑
j∈N(i) tj .
10
Let α =
(
α1, α2, ..., α|N |
)T be the vector of users’ original willingness to cre-
ate. Replace
∑
j∈N(i) tj in eq. (1.2) with
∑
j∈N(i) αi/β, and we have the users’ best
responses of browsing time vi =
∑
j∈N(i) αj/β
2 − ηpi/β. In matrix form, v =
(Gα/β − ηp) /β. Combining that the monopolist’s profit function is pi = pTv, the
monopolist’s profit maximization problem is: max
p∈R|N|+
pT (Gα/β − ηp) /β. Solv-
ing the profit maximization problem, we have:
Proposition 1.1. Let γ = 0. The monopolist’s optimal price strategy is given by
p∗ = Gα/ (2βη), such that users’ dual activities are given by
t∗ =
1
β
α and v∗ =
1
2β2
Gα
in SPE.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
This proposition is not hard to derive. However, it reveals some fundamental in-
tuition for the monopolist’s pricing plan and users’ dual activities with asymmetric
interpersonal effects.
The monopolist’s discriminating pricing plan on each user is proportional to her/his
weighted degree, which is the sum of her/his friends’ exogenous willingness to create.
It differs from the cases of Bloch and Que´rou (2013) and Candogan et al. (2012), which
consider one action with a symmetrical interpersonal network externality and derive a
uniform pricing plan. In their cases, the symmetry of local network externality leads
to the uniform pricing plan, since the monopolist’s incentives to price a user more
induced by the local network externality cancel out her/his incentives to subsidize
10If vi = 0, the monopolist gains no profit from user i, and the monopolist’s profit from any other
user on the network is independent from her/his choice of pi. See also the proof of Proposition 1.1 in
the Section 1.7.2.
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the user induced by that. However, for the dual activities of users in our cases, the
monopolist prices the behavior which is locally and unilaterally affected by the other
behavior. Thus, the monopolist has the incentive to price the browsing behavior but no
incentive to subsidize it due to the asymmetry of the browsing and creating behavior.
Therefore, pricing plans in our cases depend on each user’s degree centrality.
1.3.2 Generalization
In this section, we study the cases where the interpersonal network externality of cre-
ating behavior appears (γ 6= 0). We focus on the unique and interior solutions such
that we can compare the effects of γ on users’ behavior and the monopolist pricing
plan in equilibrium.
The second stage of the game is solved by envelope theorem and potential game.
The reason for using potential game is due to the existence of corner solutions and
the multiplicities of those in the games with local network substitutes. If the potential
function of the game is strictly concave and some more conditions are satisfied, we
are able to focus on the unique and interior solutions for further comparative static
studies. It is firstly introduced by Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) to analyze the games with
local network substitutes by potential game.
We firstly show the condition for the uniqueness of solutions in equilibria, and the
full characterization of unique and interior solutions for both γ > 0 and γ < 0 follows.
By the envelope theorem, a user’s one action corresponds to her/his other action
accordingly in her/his utility maximization problem. Here, we choose each user’s cre-
ating behavior to solve the equilibrium at the second stage. The details are as follows.
The partial derivative of U with respect to vi is:
∂U
∂vi
=
∑
j∈N(i)
tj + γti − ηpi − βvi. (1.3)
Solve ∂U/∂vi = 0, and we have user i’s browsing time as a function of creating time
ti presenting as :
v (ti) =
∑
j∈N(i) tj + γti − ηpi
β
. (1.4)
Assume that v (ti) > 0. We replace vi in eq. (1.1) with v (ti) denoted by eq. (1.4)
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resulting in:
U ((ti, v (ti)) ; t−i,v−i, pi) = αiti − 1
2
βt2i +
1
2β
 ∑
j∈N(i)
tj + γti − ηpi
2 . (1.5)
The F.O.C. of eq. (1.5) w.r.t ti is as follows:
dU ((ti, v (ti)) ; t−i,v−i, pi)
dti
= αi − βti + γ
β
 ∑
j∈N(i)
tj + γti − ηpi
 = 0.
Let δ = (β2 − γ2)−1. Therefore, if ti, v (ti) > 0, we can write user i’s best re-
sponse of creating time as ti = βδαi + γδ
∑
j∈N(i) tj − γδηpi. Note that: (i) if γ > 0,
v (ti) > 0 implies ti > αi/β; (ii) if γ < 0, v (ti) > 0 implies ti < αi/β.
Assume that for all k ∈ N , tk, v (tk) > 0. In matrix form, we have t = βδα +
γδGt−γδηp. In the best responses of creating time, the local network externality fac-
tor within creating time is γδ, which can be regarded as a index of relative magnitude
of intrapersonal effect with respect to the rate of diminishing return. The intrapersonal
cross-activity externality γ increases the interpersonal effects within users’ creating
activity γδ; the index of rate of diminishing return β reduces each activity, by which it
also reduces the interpersonal effects within users’ creating activity γδ.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) state that for payoff functions U˜ which are contin-
uous and twice-differentiable, there exists a potential function, if and only if for all
i 6= j, ∂2U˜i/∂ti∂tj = ∂2U˜j/∂tj∂ti.
Let Ui and Uj denote U ((ti, v (ti)) ; t−i,v−i, pi) and U ((tj, v (tj)) ; t−j,v−j, pj)
as shown in eq. (1.5) respectively. We take the mixed partial derivatives of Ui and Uj
w.r.t. ti and tj . Thus, we have ∂2Ui/∂ti∂tj = ∂2Uj/∂tj∂ti = γgij/β, which satisfies
the condition of Monderer and Shapley (1996). Therefore, given a pricing plan p, we
have potential function:
ϕ (t;α,p,G) = δtT (βα− ηγp)− 1
2
tT (I− γδG) t.
The maxima and saddle points of ϕ correspond to the set of equilibria of the game
(Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) Lemma 1.). In our case, t satisfies Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(i) Assume γ > 0, then ti ≥ αi/β. If ϕ is strictly concave, then ti = αi/β ⇒
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∂ϕ/∂ti ≤ 0, and ti > αi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti = 0; if ϕ is convex, for all i ti → +∞.
(ii) Assume γ < 0, then 0 ≤ ti ≤ αi/β. Therefore, ti = 0 ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti ≤ 0,
0 < ti < αi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti = 0, and ti = αi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti ≥ 0.11
Potential function ϕ has a unique maximum on R|N |+ if and only ifH (ϕ) = ∇2ϕ =
− (I− γδG), the Hessian matrix of ϕ, is negative definite. As − (I− γδG) is a
Hermitian matrix, it is negative definite if and only if all of its eigenvalues are neg-
ative. Let A denote an |N | × |N | squared matrix, and let λ (A) denote an eigen-
value of matrix A. Therefore, if the maximal eigenvalue of H (ϕ) λmax (H (ϕ))is
smaller than 0, we have a unique solution for the second stage of the game. Then,
λmax (H (ϕ)) = λmax (−I+ γδG) < 0, which is equivalent to −1 + δλmax (γG) < 0.
Therefore:
Lemma 1.1. If λmax (γG) < δ−1, for any price vector p, there exists a unique equi-
librium in the second stage of game.
If γ > 0, λmax (γG) = γλmax (G). Condition γλmax (G) < δ−1 is the sufficient
and necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The
largest eigenvalue of G determines the equilibrium. If λmax (G) > (γδ)
−1, ϕ is not
strictly concave inR|N |+ such that the cumulative network externalities are large enough
to drive every user’s time spending to infinite. The condition and results are derived
by Ballester et al. (2006), Corbo et al. (2007), Ballester and Calvo´-Armengol (2010)
et al.
If γ < 0, λmax (γG) = γλmin (G) in which λmin (G) is the smallest eigenvalue of
G. Condition |λmin (G) | < |γδ|−1 is a sufficient condition only. The condition and
results are derived by Bramoulle´ et al. (2014). If |λmin (G) | > |γδ|−1, there exists at
least one equilibrium with some agent who is either inactive in creating or inactive in
browsing.
The condition can be rewritten as |λmax (G) | < |γδ|−1 if γ > 0 or |λmin (G) | <
|γδ|−1if γ < 0. In both cases, given a network G, the magnitude of relative intraper-
sonal effects |γδ| should be smaller enough to ensure the existence and uniqueness of
equilibria.
11If γ < 0 and for some user i ti = αi/β, then user i’s browsing time binds such that vi = v (ti) = 0.
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We focus on the unique and interior solutions. If the solutions are unique and
interior. Then, by solving arg max
t∈R|N|+
ϕ (t;α,p,G), creating time is:
t = δ (I− γδG)−1 (βα− ηγp) ,
and the browsing time is
v = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα− βηp) .
The monopolist’s profit function is pi = pTv. Combining with the two previous sen-
tences, monopolist’s profit maximization problem is:
argp∈RN+ p
T δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα− βηp) .
The Hessian matrix of pi is H (pi) = ∇2pi = −βηδ (I− γδG)−1, which is negative
definite. Therefore, it has a unique profit maximization point. We solve the profit
maximization problem, and have the necessary conditions for unique and interior so-
lutions. Combining with the sufficiency of these conditions, we have the following
proposition:12
Proposition 1.2. Let λmax (γG) < δ−1. If and only if:
(i) γ > 0, or
(ii) γ < 0 and for all i ((G+ γI)α)i > 0, and−αi < β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
< αi;
the SPE has a unique and interior solution, in which the monopolist’s pricing strategy
is p∗ = (G+ γI)α/ (2ηβ), users’ strategy of their dual activities is given by
t∗ =
1
2β
(
I+ β2δ (I− γδG)−1)α and v∗ = δ
2
(I− γδG)−1 (G+ γI)α.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
The intuition for the condition of the proposition is as follows. The solution of a
strictly concave function is unique and interior if and only if the solution satisfies the
12Please see the proof of Proposition 1.2 at Section 1.7.2 for details.
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F.O.C.s and is interior. In our cases, the solution satisfies that for all i pi, ti, vi > 0. As-
suming γ > 0. Then, every entry of pricing plan p∗ = (G+ γI)α/ (2ηβ) is positive;
users’ dual activity, every entry of creating time t∗ =
(
I+ β2δ (I− γδG)−1)α/ (2β)
is positive and so is every entry of v∗ = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα) /2, since every
entry of (I− γδG)−1 is positive if γ > 0. Therefore, the solution of equilibria with
γ > 0 is unique and interior.
If γ < 0, at the maximum of profit function, we have p∗ = (G+ γI)α/ (2ηβ),
t∗ =
(
I+ β2δ (I− γδG)−1)α/ (2β) and v∗ = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα) /2. The
necessity and sufficiency of the condition that for all i ((G+ γI)α)i > 0, and −αi <
β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
< αi are straightforward. In details, the condition that for
all i, ((G+ γI)α)i > 0 is for p
∗ to be interior; if condition that for all i −αi <
β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
< αi is satisfied, then for all i it is for 0 < t∗i < αi/β such that
for all i v∗i > 0.
To compare with the case γ = 0, we subtract the p∗ with Gα/ (2βη), which is
the monopolist’s pricing plan in cases where γ = 0 (See alsoProposition 1.1), which
results in ∆p = p∗−Gα/ (2βη) = γα/ (2ηβ). It means that the intrapersonal cross-
activity externality does not bring network-dependent factors into the monopolist’s
pricing plan. The result coincides with the cases studied by Candogan et al. (2012)
and Bloch and Que´rou (2013). The intuition of the results is: the local externality
of users’ creating behavior induced by intrapersonal externalities is symmetrical in
monopolist’s profit function’s F.O.C.s, such that the profit increasing from pricing one
user more is canceled out by the profit increasing from pricing the user less for the
purposes of pricing the user’s friends more.
Both of users’ two activities are linear in Katz-Bonacich centrality in equilibrium.
Compared with the case without intrapersonal externality where t∗ = α/β, the creat-
ing time with intrapersonal effect is t∗ = α/ (2β) + β2δ (I− γδG)−1 α/ (2β). User
i’s creating time can be jointly described by i’s willingness to create αi and i’s Katz-
Bonacich centrality–the cumulative network effects on user i. It is supported by the
following intuition: user i’s creating time is induced by her/his willingness to create
(the first term), and it is boosted by i’s interaction with her/his friends on the social
media (the second term). With neutralized intrapersonal effects (γ = 0), the boosted
creating time (the second term) equals to the induced creating time (the first term),
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which means that even though users spend time on creating, their behavior depends
on their own willingness to create only. If user i’s dual activities are complements
(γ > 0), the boosted creating time (the second term) is larger than the induced creat-
ing time (the first term); if user i’s dual activities are substitutes (γ < 0), the boosted
time (the second term) depends on the overall substitute and complementary network
effects on the users.13
The browsing time of users is v∗ = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα) /2. User i’s brows-
ing time depends on the sum of cumulative network effects on her/his friends, and it
increases (decreases) with that effect on herself/himself if γ > 0 (γ < 0). The results
are supported by that any user i’s browsing behavior is boosted by her/his friends’
creating. But why does the first term of a user’s creating time has dependency on orig-
inal creating willingness but it is not the case that the user browsing time is boosted
by her/his friends’ original willingness to create? The reason is that: with pricing
plan p∗ = (G+ γI)α/ (2ηβ), the monopolist extracts the benefit of users’ boosted
by original creating of her/his friends; and she/he prices the users own original will-
ingness to create if γ > 0 but the monopolist subsidizes users’ browsing behavior by
pricing less if γ < 0. Therefore, user i’s browsing time depends on the cumulative
network effects on his/her friends, but it does not depend on their original willingness
to create.
In empirical studies, we observe that most users on friend-based social media spend
95% of their time on browsing ( Benevenuto et al. (2009) and Schneider et al. (2009)).
It means that the case we study where the intrapersonal cross-activity substitute ap-
pears γ < 0 fits better to real-life cases. An average user has 338 friends on Facebook
(Mazie (2014)). The huge amount of available content on social media consumes their
time on browsing, which deduce users’ content creating activity.
1.4 Dual-activity Pricing and Subsidizing Plan
Consider that the monopolist not only prices the users’ browsing activity, but also sub-
sidizes their creating activity. In this section, we show that, in SPE, both the monopo-
13 As Katz-Bonacich centrality counts all the paths with both oddly and evenly numbered steps of
one node to reach all nodes in the networks. If γ < 0, the paths with oddly numbered steps to i
contribute negative effects to the cumulative network effects on i, and the paths with evenly numbered
steps contribute positively to that.
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list’ plan and users’ dual activities depend on a new network measure– Katz-Bonacich
centrality of degree 2. Then, we will explain its implication in our model. In Sec-
tion 1.4.2, we show how the Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 differs from other
centrality measures.
We use qT =
(
q1, q2, q3, ..., q|N |
) ∈ R|N |+ to denote the monopolist’s subsidizing
plan, such that qi ∈ R+ represents how much the monopolist subsidizes user i for
her/his one unit time spending on creating. For every user i, her/his creating utilities
increase by κqiti due to the monopolist’s subsidizing, in which κ ∈ (0, η). Parameter κ
is smaller than η, which means that users’ utilities’ increase from one unit of subsidies
is smaller than her/his disutilities’ from watching advertisements once.14
The utility function of user i with subsidizing denoted by Uˆ is:
Uˆ ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi) = αiti− 1
2
βt2i +κqiti + vi
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − 1
2
βv2i − ηpivi + γtivi.
(1.6)
Then, the monopolist’s profit maximization problem is:
max
p,q
pTv − qT t. (1.7)
We study the case with γ = 0. For the cases where γ 6= 0, please see Section 1.7.3.
1.4.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We focus on the unique and interior solutions. If γ = 0, user i’s utility function with
qi Uˆ is:
Uˆ ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi) = αiti − 1
2
βt2i + κqiti + vi
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − 1
2
βv2i − ηpivi.
The F. O. C.s of Uˆ are:
∂Uˆ
∂ti
= αi + κqi − βti = 0;
14If κ > η, the monopolist can gain infinity profit by choosing a friend of i j ∈ N (i) and making a
plan as pj > qi and qi → +∞.
1.4. Dual-activity Pricing and Subsidizing Plan 20
∂Uˆ
∂vi
=
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − ηpi − βvi = 0.
Solve ∂Uˆ/∂ti = 0 and ∂Uˆ/∂vi = 0 simultaneously, and write them in matrix
form. We have:
t =
1
β
α +
κ
β
q (1.8)
and
v =
1
β2
Gα +
κ
β2
Gq− η
β
p. (1.9)
Replace t and v from eq. (1.8) and eq. (1.9) in the profit function eq. (1.7):
pi = −qT
(
α
β
+
κq
β
)
+ pT
(
Gα
β2
+
κGq
β2
− ηp
β
)
. (1.10)
Let xT =
(
pT ,qT
)
denote the monopolist’s pricing and subsidizing plans on users.
Also, we define vectors or matrices as follows: , Iu,l =
 I
0
0
0
, Ib,r =
 0
0
0
I
,
Iu,r =
 0
0
I
0
 and B =
 G
0
0
G
. Then, the profit function eq. (1.10) can be
rewritten as:
pi (p,q) =
− 1
β
xT Ib,r
 α
α
+ 1
β2
xT Iu,lB
 α
α
− κ
β
xT Ib,rx+
κ
β2
xT Iu,rBx− η
β
xT Iu,lx.
(1.11)
The Hessian matrix of the monopolist’s profit function eq. (1.11) is:
H (pi) =
1
β2
 −2ηβI
κG
κG
−2κβI
 .
The unique maximum of pi exists if and only if its Hessian matrix is negative defi-
nite. Since H (pi) a Hermitian matrix, it is negative definite if and only if the largest
eigenvalue of H (pi) is negative, which means λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ.15
The F. O. C.s of eq. (1.11) are as follows:
15For the details of calculation, see the proof of Proposition 1.3 in Section 1.7.2.
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∇pi = − 1
β
 0
α
+ 1
β2
 Gα
α
+ 1
β2
 −2ηβI
κG
κG
−2κβI
x.
Solve ∇pi = 0. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3. Let γ = 0. If and only if λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ, the monopolist’s profit
function is strictly concave such that it has a unique maximum. Further, if and only
if λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ and for all i, for all i
((
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2 − I
)−1
α
)
i
>
0, the SPE has an interior solution, in which the monopolist’s optimal pricing and
subsidizing plan is given by:
p∗ =
1
4ηβ
G
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α and q∗ =
1
2κ
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α− 1
κ
α;
the users’ creating time and browsing time are given by:
t∗ =
1
2β
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α and v∗ =
1
4β2
G
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
Condition that for all i
((
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2 − I
)−1
α
)
i
> 0 is sufficient and
necessary for the results. The SPE solution is interior if and only if the solution satisfies
the F.O.C.s and for all i pi, qi, ti, vi > 0. The expressions for p∗, q∗ and t∗ ensure that
all of their entries are positive, since every entry of matrix
(
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2 − I
)−1
is positive. For every entry of subsidizing plan q∗ to be positive, the sufficiency and ne-
cessity of condition that for all i
((
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2 − I
)−1
α
)
i
> 0 are straight-
forward.
We name κ/η as users’ cross-activity responding rate to the monopolist’s plan or
responding rate for short. By the condition ensuring the positiveness of q∗, i. e.,
for all i such that
(
G2
(
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2
)−1
α
)
i
κ/η > 4β2αi, we know that the
monopolist has the incentive to subsidize all users, if users’ responding rate to her/his
dual activity pricing and subsidizing plan is high enough.
Consider the condition for the strict concavity of profit function, i. e., λmax (G) <
2β
√
η/κ. The existence of equilibria depends on the network structure G, the rate of
diminishing return β and users’ responding rate κ/η. Given a network G, if the index
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of rate of diminishing return is low or users’ responding rate κ/η is high enough such
that λmax (G) ≥ 2β
√
η/κ, the monopolist can use pricing and subsidizing plan (p,q)
to drive users’ time spending and the profit to infinity. By the observation of real life,
we could infer that users’ responding rate is low in real life.
The Katz-Bonacich centralities b (G, θ) = M (G, θ)1 are with matrixM (G, θ) =
(I− θG)−1 such that θ ∈ R and (I− θG)−1 is contracting. In the SPE with dual-
activity pricing and subsidizing plans, the centralities are with matrix M (G2, θ) =
(I− θG2)−1 in which θ ∈ R and (I− θG2)−1 is contracting. We name b (G2, θ) =
(I− θG2)−1 1 as the vector of Katz-Bonacich centrality with degree 2 of network G.
See also Section 1.7.1. We will firstly explain the intuition of the results and then com-
pare our cases with Chen et al. (2018a). For the studies of Katz-Bonacich Centrality
of degree 2 on typical network structures, please see Section 1.4.2.
For the subsidizing plan q∗, term −α/κ in q∗ implies that the monopolist neutral-
izes agents’ original willingness to create and boosts users’ willingness to create by
their Katz-Bonacich of centrality of degree 2 (I− κ/ (4ηβ2)G2)−1 α/ (2κ).
The results are supported by the following intuition. Katz-Bonacich centrality
counts all the paths with both odd and even numbered steps of one node to reach all
nodes in the networks. However, Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 counts the paths
with even numbered steps of that only. To understand why the monopolist chooses a
pricing and subsidizing plan depending on Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2, let
us consider what comprises the number of paths with 2 steps on a network for a user.
For user i, the first composition is the number of i’s friends, since a user can always
go to his/her neighborhood and go back to herself/himself with two steps; the second
composition is the number of user i’ friends’ friends. That is to say, the monopolist
chooses to subsidy the users who have high degrees and also have high correctness
to their friends’ friends. The monopolist’s incentive to subsidy the users with high
degrees is easy to understand. For subsidizing a user’s friends’ friends, the monopolist
can price a user’s friends more by the combining effects of boosting the user’s post
and also her/his friends’ friends’ post. The monopolist has no incentive to subsidize
the users who are with 3 steps from user i due to the lack of the combining effects.
However, by subsidizing the users who are with 4 steps away from user i, the subsidies
on users who are 2 steps away from user i become more valuable to the monopolist,
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which also make the subsidies on user i become more valuable. It is the same idea for
the users who reach user i with 6 steps, 8 steps, 10 steps...... Therefore, the monopolist
uses subsidizing plans which are dependent on Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2.
If the monopolist can price one activity only, her/his pricing plan extracts the
value of users’ browsing activity boosted by their friends’ willingness to create (p∗ =
(G+ γI)α/ (2ηβ)) at most. If the monopolist can price and subsidize at the same
time, she/he can stimulate users’ creating activity with global network effects with
neutralizing their creating activity boosted by their own willingness to create (the mo-
nopolist’s subsidizing plan q∗ = (I− κ/ (4ηβ2)G2)−1 α/ (2κ) − α/κ and users’
creating time t∗ = (I− κ/ (4ηβ2)G2)−1 α/ (2β)). By using the subsidizing plan
with global network effects, the monopolist can gain more profit with pricing users’
browsing activity, which is boosted by their friends’ creating activity with global net-
work effects ( users’ browsing time v∗ = G (I− κ/ (4ηβ2)G2)−1 α/ (4ηβ) and the
monopolist’s pricing plan p∗ = G (I− κ/ (4ηβ2)G2)−1 α/ (4β2)).
The asymmetric network effects in each profit function are essential to derive
network-dependent pricing plan both in Chen et al. (2015)’s case and in our cases. In
Chen et al. (2018a)’s case, the asymmetry is captured by two profit maximization goals
due to duopoly competition; in our case, the asymmetry is captured by the asymmet-
ric interpersonal across dual activities. In Chen et al. (2018a)’s duopoly setting with
symmetrical interpersonal effects within each activity(ti
∑
j∈N(i) tj and vi
∑
j∈N(i) vj),
firm A gains profit from pricing activity A only. Thus, the network effects of activ-
ity B on activity A in the F.O.C.s of firm A’s profit function is asymmetric, and the
same for firm B. Therefore, the network effect can not be cancelled out and results
in that the pricing plan is proportional to Katz-Bonacich centrality. However, these
network effects vanish in pricing in monopolist setting. The two activities and the two
pricing plans are symmetric in the F.O.C.s of monopolist’s profit function; therefore,
the network effects are all cancelled out by monopolist’s balancing the profits of two
activities. In our cases, the asymmetry of network effects preserves in the monopo-
list’s profit function, which enable us to derive the network-dependent subsidizing and
pricing plan in monopolist setting.
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1.4.2 Katz-Bonacich Centrality of degree 2 on simple networks
For the simplicity of discussion, we use KB to denote Katz-Bonacich centrality and
KB-2 to denote Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 in this section. We focus on
the network structure’s effects on KB and KB-2, such that we assume that α = 1T
and θ > 0 is small enough, such that for a graph G, the KB of G is denoted as
b (G, θ) = (I− θG)−1 1 and KB-2 of G is denoted as b (G2, θ) = (I− θG2)−1 1.
The KB ranking of nodes in a network is not necessarily preserved in their KB-2
ranking. The rankings of KB and KB-2 could be different even in simple networks,
such as stars. Figure 1.1 shows the process we analyze KB-2 of a 4-node star: we
derive a graph, whose KB ranking is equivalent to KB-2’s ranking of the 4-node star.
Therefore, for a graph G, we derive a graph G′ such that b (G2, θ)1 = b (G′, θ)1.
The process of deriving the equivalent graph and explanation of that are as follows.
Figure 1.1 The KB Equivalent Form of 4-node star’s KB-2.
The network on the top left is a star network with 4 nodes in Figure 1.1. We link
two nodes if they can reach each other in a path with two steps. The periphery nodes
in the star can reach other periphery nodes with two steps, and they can also reach
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themselves with two steps by traveling to the center node and then come back; for
the node in the center, it can reach itself though three different paths with two steps
by traveling to the three periphery nodes and come back. Therefore, we have the
network on the top right, whose KB is equivalent to the KB-2 of the top left 4-node
star network. footnoteThis process of simplification works well for simple graphs. For
the analysis of more complex graphs, the process does not necessarily help to reduce
the calculation of finding the KB-2, e.g., the nested networks in Ko¨nig et al. (2014).
The two graphs at the bottom of Figure 1.1 show the equivalent forms of each
disconnected component at the top right graph. For the graph at the bottom left, a
node with three loops’ KB equals to the KB of a node in 4-node complete graph: for
each node in the complete network, there are three edges to reach the next node; and it
is the same for a single node with 3 loops, since it has three paths to go back to itself.
For the graph at the bottom right, any node’s KB in a complete 3-node network with
each node having a loop equals to KB of any node in a 4-node complete network. This
is due to that: for a complete 3-node network with each node having a loop, consider
replacing all the loops with a hypothetical node which links to every original node.
Therefore, for each node, they can still reach themselves (hypothetical one) and go to
any node including themselves.
Therefore, every node shares the same KB-2 in the 4-star node network, due to the
symmetry of two complete 4-node networks.
Figure 1.2 shows an example where the ranking of KB preserves in KB-2. In Fig-
ure 1.2, the network on the left is a 4-node line. The two nodes in the middle have
higher KB than the other two periphery nodes have. For the KB-2, please see the fol-
lowing analysis. The network in the middle of the figure results from we linking the
nodes which reach each other by two steps. The network on the right is the equivalent
network sharing the same KB with the network in the middle. The nodes in the mid-
dle of line correspond to the nodes at the bottom left of each component in the right
graph; and the periphery nodes in the line correspond to the nodes at top right of each
component in the right graph. The top left node in a component is the hypothetical
node which connects to both nodes. The node in the middle of the 4-node line has
two loops, therefore, it has an additional hypothetical node which is directed to the
periphery node. Therefore, we have that the nodes in the middle of the 4-node line
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Figure 1.2 The KB Equivalent Form of 4-node line’s KB-2.
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Figure 1.3 The KB Equivalent Form of Example 1.1’s KB-2.
have higher KB-2 than the nodes at the periphery, such that the KB ranking preserves
for KB-2 in the 4-node line.
Now, we use the following Example 1.1 to show that for some nodes in a network,
their KB ranking and KB-2 ranking could be reversed.
Example 1.1 Consider the network in Figure 1.3, where user 1 and user 2 are the most
central two users in the network, and user 1’s KB is larger than user 2’s. For KB-2,
please see the graph on the right whose KB is equivalent to KB-2 of the network on
the left. In the graph on the right, node 2, which has two loops to itself, is connected
to 4 nodes with one step, all the nodes node 2 connected to have one loop and node 3,
4, and 5 have a link to each other; however, node 1, which also has two loops to itself,
are connected to 3 nodes, which have links to each other.
It is strict to have the following statements for the rankings of KB-2 of Exam-
ple 1.1: (i) node 2 is with the highest ranking; (ii) node 6 is ranked below node 3, 4
and 5.
Table 1.1 shows how the rankings reversed with numbers with θ = 1/6.
The first column of Table 1.1 shows each user’s index corresponding to her/his
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i p′i =
1
3
|Ni| pi = 16
(
Gb
(
G2, 1
6
))
i
qi =
1
2
(
b
(
G2, 1
6
))
i
(
b
(
G, 1
6
))
i
1 1.33 2.57 1.14 1.92
2 0.67 1.14 1.36 1.56
3,4,5 0.33 0.71 0.79 1.32
6 0.67 1.14 0.29 1.47
7 0.33 0.43 0.07 1.24
Table 1.1 Pricing only plan p′ and dual-activity pricing and subsidizing plan p,q
representing node’s index in Figure 1.3. Given β = 1, γ = 0, η = 1.5 and α = 1T ,
Table 1.1’s second column shows the monopolist’s pricing only strategy p′, which is
proportional to users’ degree; the third and fourth columns of Table 1.1 show her/his
dual-activity pricing and subsidizing strategy p and q, in which p is proportional to
the sum of users’ friends’ Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2, and q is linear in
users’ Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2; the last column shows the KB. See also
Section 1.7.1.
For p and q, user 2 has the highest subsidizing plan and the second highest pricing
plan among all users. However, user 1 has the second highest subsidizing plan, but
the highest pricing plan. Moreover, user 3, 4, 5 have higher subsidizing plan, but lower
pricing plan than user 6 does.
The monopolist has higher willingness to subsidize the user i who reaches more
users with 2 steps, such that with boosting their creating (user i and the users with 2
steps from her/him), the monopolist can price more on user i’s friends.
Compare pricing only plan p′ and p, which is the pricing plan in dual activity pric-
ing and subsidizing plan. For every user i in the network, pi > p′i. For other centralities
measures, the rankings of users’ degrees, KB and the sum of users’ neighbors’ KB-2
are the same.
1.5 Comparative Static Studies
Social media owners recommend new friends to build denser social networks, and both
the owners and their users exert efforts to improve the ways of interacting on the social
media, which increases intrapersonal cross-activity externalities. We examine the two
effects in comparative static studies. In details, Section 1.5.1 studies the effects of net-
work structures on the monopolist’s profit and users’ time spending. In Section 1.5.2,
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we study the effect of intrapersonal cross-activity externality on the monopolist’s profit
and users’ dual activities.
The comparative static studies apply to the cases where the monopolist prices
users’ browsing behavior such that κ = 0.
1.5.1 Network Structures
Adding one link between user i and user j has two effects: (i) the change of adjacency
matrix G has an impact on users’ behavior and the monopolist’s pricing plan; (ii) αi
and αj might be affected, since αi captures the exogenous network-dependent factors
as mentioned in Remark (ii) at the end of Section 1.2. We study each effect separately,
then we consider the aggregate effects. The results show the monopolist’s profit in-
creases if γ ≥ 0, and for γ < 0, more information are needed to justify the effects
of structural changes of networks on the monopolist’s profit. Moreover, we study the
profitability of networks with the same number of nodes and links but different degree
distributions.
The comparative studies on network structures changes are discrete mathematical
analysis. If γ ≥ 0, the analysis is straightforward. However, if γ < 0, the analysis
becomes complex. The mathematical technique we used in this section is introduced
by Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) in which they study the effect of adding links on total
activity level in games with local network substitutes. We extend their technique of
potential functions to analyze the effect of network structure on the monopolist’s profit.
Adding Links
Consider network G and its supergraph G′, for which there exists exactly one pair of
users i and j such that i and j are not connected in G lij /∈ G, but they are connected
in G′such that G′ = G+ lij . Consider that both equilibria on the two networks G and
G′ are unique and interior solutions.
The effects of adding a new link to user i and user j are different as γ varies. If
γ = 0, a new link added between users i and j increases their browsing activities and
the pricing plans on them. Thus, the monopolist’s profit increases. If γ > 0, a new link
added between users i and j boosts all users’ time spending on their dual activities;
also, the pricing plans on users i and j increase accordingly. Thus, the monopolist’s
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profit increases. If γ < 0, user i and user j’s browsing time increases; and their
creating time decreases, which affects their friends’ dual activities and so on so forth.
Therefore, there is ambiguity of how adding a link will affect the time spending and
the monopolist’s profit on the network.
We use potential function to solve the question. Consider a |N | × |N | diagonal
matrix C such that Cii ∈ C and Cii = (αi)−1 and a new potential function ψ (x,G) =
xT1− xTC (I− γδG)x/2. The Hessian matrix of ψ denoted H (ψ) is:
H (ψ) =
1
2
C (I− γδG) + 1
2
(I− γδG)C.
If matrix (I− γδG) is positive definite, then matricesH (ψ (x,G)) and H (ψ (x,G′))
are positive definite.16 If the maximizers of ψ (x,G) and ψ (x,G′) are interior, then
ψ (x∗,G) = αT (I+ γδG)−1 1/2, which is the part of
∑
t∗i varying from different
G, we need to analyze the maximum ψ (x,G) and ψ (x′∗,G′) only. That is to say, if
ψ (x∗,G) > ψ (x′∗,G′), then
∑
t∗i >
∑
t′∗i . Graph G is a subgraph of G
′, such that
ψ (x′∗,G′) − ψ (x′∗,G) = γδx′∗i x′∗j < 0. Thus, we have ψ (x′∗,G′) < ψ (x′∗,G) <
ψ (x∗,G). Therefore,
∑
x∗i >
∑
x′∗i and
∑
t∗i >
∑
t′∗i . For the sum of browsing
time, we have:
vT1 =
δ
2
αT (G+ γI) (I− γδG)−1 1
=
1
2γ
αT1− 1
γ
β2δx∗T1.
The value of second term correspond negatively to ψ. Thus,
∑
v′∗i >
∑
v∗i .
For the analysis on monopolist’s profit in the cases where γ < 0, please see the
proof of Proposition 1.4 in Section 1.7.2. The results show that, if γδ > −2β, the
overall effects on the monopolist’s profit is positive. Therefore:
Proposition 1.4. Consider a network G and a G′ such that G′ = G+ lij and lij /∈ G.
Given a γ and an vector α, t∗ and v∗ are assigned by the equilibrium strategy of
16 We prove that the product of two positive definite symmetric matrices is also positive definite.
Suppose A and B are symmetric and positive definite. Suppose λ is the eigenvalue of AB and its
corresponding eigenvector is x, then ABx = λx. Thus, BABx = λBx ⇒ xTBABx = λxTBx.
Consider y = Bx, then we have yTAy = λxTBx. Since A and B are both positive definite matrices,
then yTAy > 0 and xTBx > 0. Thus, we have for any eigenvalue λ =
(
yTAy
)
/(xTBx) > 0
and AB is positive definite. Thus, BA is also positive definite. As C and (I− γδG) are positive
definite and the sum of two positive definite matrices are also positive definite, we have that matrices
H (ψ (x,G)) and H (ψ (x,G′)) are positive definite.
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users with network G, and the monopolist’s profit with pricing plan p∗ is pi∗; and t′∗
and v′∗ are assigned by the equilibrium strategy of users with network G′, and the
monopolist’s profit with pricing plan p′∗ is pi′∗. If matrices I− γδG and I− γδG′ are
positive definite and both (p∗, t∗,v∗) and (p′∗, t′∗,v′∗) are interior solutions, then:
(i) Assume γ = 0. For the users’ dual activities: t∗ = t′∗, v∗i,j < v
′∗
i,j and for all k
in N \ {i, j}, v∗k = v′∗k . The monopolist’s profits satisfy pi∗ < pi′∗.
(ii) Assume γ > 0. For all i, t∗i < t
′∗
i and v
∗
i < v
′∗
i . The monopolist’s profits satisfy
pi∗ < pi′∗.
(iii) Assume γ < 0. For the users’ dual activities,
∑
j∈N t
∗
j >
∑
j∈N t
′∗
j and
∑
v∗i <∑
v′∗i . If γδ/ (2β) > −1, then the monopolist’s profits satisfy pi∗ < pi′∗.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
The condition γδ/ (2β) > −1 ensures the increase of monopolist’s profit with
denser networks in the case where γ < 0.17 The intuition is as follows. The increase
of monopolist’ profit is ensured if the increase of users i and j’s browsing time does
not discourage their creating time spending so much, by which it demands that the
relative magnitude of intrapersonal effect to be small enough.18
In Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)’s analysis on local network substitutes, the overall ac-
tivity level increases. In our model, if the dual activities of each user are substitutes,
the effect of adding a new link to the existing network increases the overall activity
level of browsing behavior, but it decreases that of creating behavior. The intuition of
that is: with asymmetric cross-activity externality, browsing behavior which is directly
affected by the network structure, increases with network density; however, the other
behavior (creating behavior), which is indirectly affected by the network structure,
decreases with network density due to the intrapersonal substitutes between the dual
activities.
17Condition γδ/ (2β) > −1 is satisfied if β > 1/2, since γδ > −1 as the smallest eigenvalue of
any undirected graph is smaller than or equal to −1. If β ≤ 1/2, we solve γδ/ (2β) > −1 and have
(4β)
−1 −
√
(16β2)
−1
+ β2 < γ < 0.
18If β > 1/2, the relative magnitude can be ensured by the condition for the uniqueness of equilibria,
which is essentially a index of relative magnitude of intrapersonal effects with the index of rate of
diminishing return.
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We now consider the second effect of denser network. Assume that original will-
ingness to create of users i and j increases with a new link added between them. We
start with the case where ∃i > 0 such that α′i = αi + i and α′j = αj , then it could be
generalized to the case that ∃i, j > 0 such that α′i = αi + i and α′j = αj + j . If the
intrapersonal effects are neutralized γ = 0, the increasing of one user i’s willingness to
create leads to the monopolist raising the pricing plan on the user’s friends; and it also
lead s to the increase of the user’s friends’ browsing time spending. If the intrapersonal
effects are complementary γ > 0, the positive intrapersonal cross-activity externality
drives all users’ both time spending to a higher level.
If the intrapersonal effects are substitutes γ < 0, the negative intrapersonal exter-
nality drives lower browsing time spending of user i; however, it drives browsing time
of her/his friends to a higher level. Therefore, the overall effect remains unclear. We
invoke ψ (x,G) to ψ (x,C). We use |N | × |N | diagonal matrix C′ such that C ′ii ∈ C′
and C ′ii = α
′−1
i , such that the unique maximal interior solution of ψ (x,C
′) correspond
to the total creating time of users on the network. Using the same technique of proof in
Proposition 1.4 to compare the maximums of ψ (x,C) and ψ (x′,C′), we find that the
overall effect on creating is positive. The increase of willingness to create boosts the
overall creating activity level on the network, even though creating activity is locally
substitute in SPE. However, the overall effects on users’ total browsing time and the
monopolist’s profit remain unclear.
Proposition 1.5. Given a γ such that λmax (γG) < 1/δ, consider an α, with which t∗
and v∗ are assigned by the equilibrium strategy for users, and the monopolist’s profit
with pricing plan p∗ is pi∗; and consider anα′ = α+ such that  = (0, .., 0, i, 0, .., 0)
and i > 0, then t′∗ and v′∗ are assigned by users’ equilibrium strategy with α′, and
the monopolist’s profit with pricing plan p′∗ is pi′∗. If matrices (I− γδG) is positive
definite and both (p∗, t∗,v∗) and (p′∗, t′∗,v′∗) are interior solutions, then:
(i) Assume γ = 0. For the users’ dual activities, t∗i < t
′∗
i , for all j 6= i in N ,
t∗j = t
′∗
j , for all k in N but not in N(i), v
∗
k = v
′∗
k , and for all l in N(i), v
∗
l < v
′∗
l .
The monopolist’s profits satisfy pi∗ < pi′∗.
(ii) Assume γ > 0. For the users’ dual activities for all j inN , t∗j < t
′∗
j and v
∗
j < v
′∗
j .
The monopolist’s profit satisfy pi∗ < pi′∗.
1.5. Comparative Static Studies 32
(iii) Assume γ < 0, then
∑
j∈N t
∗
j <
∑
j∈N t
′∗
j .
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
The intuition for the increase of users’ total time spending on creating on the net-
work is: the total creating time is directly driven by the willingness to create. Com-
pared to the effect of network density on time spending, the ambiguity on how total
time of users spending on browsing behavior change is due to that creating behavior
changing has larger effects than that of network density in the first-degree influence
of network (nodes that given a user can reach by one step),19 which is the direct and
major effects. A link added to a network affect the two newly connected users in the
first-degree influence of the network; but the increase of a user’s creating time affects
the user and all of her/his friends in the first-degree influence of the network. There-
fore, the browsing time could increase or decrease depending on how many friends the
user has.
We further study the cases where γ < 0, and we find a condition under which
the profit increases. However, it is not the full characterization of nonnegative profit
changes.
Consider a new potential function:
φ (x,D) = xT1− 1
2
xTD (I− γδG)x,
where D is a diagonal matrix and Dii =
(∑
j∈N(i) αj + γαi
)−1
. Matrix D′ is the di-
agonal matrix such that D′ii =
(∑
j∈N(i) α
′
j + γα
′
i
)−1
. If matrix (I− γδG) is positive
definite, the Hessian matrix of φ of D H (φ (x,D)) = D (I− γδG) + (I− γδG)D
and that of D′ H (φ (x,D′)) = D′ (I− γδG) + (I− γδG)D′ are positive definite, as
shown in Footnote 16.
If the maximizers of φ (x∗,D) and φ (x′∗,D′) are interior, then φ (x∗,D) and
φ (x′∗,D′) correspond to
∑
v∗i and
∑
v′∗i respectively.
With condition that for all j and k such that
∑
j∈N(k) αj + γαk ≤
∑
j∈N(k) α
′
j +
γα′k, there is no decrease of pricing plan. The results show that the overall browsing
time increases, and the monopolist’s profit increases. The following steps of proof are
19Note that we use first-degree influence of network to restrict the scope of analysis on a given user
and her/his friends. The aim is to distinguish it with cumulative network effects on a user.
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almost the same as those of Proposition 1.5. For the details, please see the appendix.
Corollary 1.5.1. Given a γ < 0, consider an α, with which t∗ and v∗ are assigned
by the equilibria strategy of users, and the monopolist’s profit is pi∗with pricing plan
p∗; and consider an α′ = α +  such that  = (0, .., 0, i, 0, .., 0, j, 0, ...0) and
i, j > 0, then t′∗ and v′∗ are assigned by users’ equilibrium strategy with α′, and the
monopolist’s profit is pi′∗ with pricing plan p′∗. If matrix I−γδG is positive definite, for
both i and j such that
∑
k∈N(i) αk+γαi ≤
∑
k∈N(i) α
′
k+γα
′
i and
∑
k∈N(j) αk+γαj ≤∑
k∈N(j) α
′
k + γα
′
j , and (p
∗, t∗,v∗) and (p′∗, t′∗,v′∗) are interior, then
∑
k∈N v
∗
k <∑
k∈N v
′∗
k and pi
∗ < pi′∗.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
The results is supported by the following intuition. Even though users i’s and
j’s browsing time vi and vj decrease due to the boosting of their creating time, the
nondecreasing pricing plans for i and j and strictly increasing pricing plans on i’s and
j’s friends ensure the overall profit to increase.
To conclude the effect of adding a link to the existing networks, the monopolist’s
profit increases if γ ≥ 0; however, if γ < 0 and the condition in Corollary 1.5.1 holds,
then the monopolist’s profit increases. For other cases, more information are needed
to justify the profit changes.
Degree distribution of Networks
In this section, we consider an abstract comparative static study. Users and links are
the sources of the monopolist’s profit. If we fix the users and the total number of links
in the social networks, there are
 |N | (|N | − 1) /2
m
 possibilities of network struc-
tures in which the number of links ism. Even we just consider the connected networks,
the number of connected networks is still huge. A question is raised: which network
can the monopolist gain more profit from? For the networks with the same numbers of
nodes and edges, we find that: (i) if the intrapersonal effects are not neutralized γ 6= 0,
the monopolist gains more profit from a network with more diverse degree distribu-
tion; (ii) if the intrapersonal effects are neutralized γ = 0, the monopolist gains the
same profit from any network.
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Let P and P ′ denote the degree distributions of G and G′. Let |V (G) | and
|E (G) | denote the number of users and the number of links in the network G re-
spectively. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.6. Consider two graphs G and G′ such that |V (G) | = |V (G′) |,
|E (G) | = |E (G′) |, α = α′ = α (1, 1, ..., 1)T such that α > 0 and |γδ| is small
enough, and the SPEs in both graphs have unique and interior solutions. If P ′’s vari-
ance of degree distribution is higher than that of P , then in SPEs, the monopolist gains
more profit from G′ than from G.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
Given G and G′ having the same number of nodes and edges and a small enough
|γδ|, the profits gained from network G and G′ is determined by term 1TG21 and
1TG′21 respectively, whatever γ is. The variance of the degree distribution is equiva-
lent to the overall network connectivities with 2 steps, such that the profit of the net-
work with higher variance G′ is higher than that of network G by 1TG′21 > 1TG21.
We give an example of why the variance of degree distribution affecting the prof-
itability of a network. Consider a 5-node star which is the network with most diverse
degree distribution among all networks with 5 nodes and 4 edges. Periphery nodes
can reach each other by 2 steps and the center node can research itself 4 times by 2
steps. Any alternating edges (changing either end of a link) will decrease the 2-step-
connectivity of the network. Therefore, the monopolist prefers networks with more
diverse degree distributions to other networks sharing the same number of nodes and
links.
We have one remark: the variance of degree distribution corresponds to the sum
of Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 of users in network G with a small enough
γδ. We can see that not only the Katz-Bonacich centrality of degree 2 captures the
combining effects of subsidizing plan on boosting creating activity, but also its sum
of a network captures the profitability of the network generated by the second degree
influence of the network (the variance of degree distribution).20
20If |γδ| is small enough, the cumulative effect by Katz-Bonacich centrality is restrict to a node’s
second degree influence. The second-degree influence is restrict to a given user and her/his friends’
friends.
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1.5.2 Intrapersonal Cross-activity Externalities
Our motivation to analyze γ’s effect on users and the monopolist is that both the social
media owner and users try to improve the ways of interaction online. Intuitively, more
ways to express users’ feeling and thoughts, more comments users would like to make
when they browse. The results show that both users and the monopolist benefit from
the increase of intrapersonal externalities.
By analyzing the first derivative of each user’s utility function and the monopolist’s
profit, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.7. If δλmax (γG) < 1, the monopolist’s profit increases with γ; if (i)
γ > 0 or (ii) γ < 0 and γ → 0, each user’s utilities increase with γ.
Proof. See Section 1.7.2.
1.6 Conclusion
We consider a certain type of interaction on social media. The design and the unique
usage of friend-based social media are characterized by the mutual consent of any two
users to establish a link and the asymmetrical interpersonal effects cross users’ dual
activities. Both the pricing browsing plans and the pricing and subsidizing plans are
network-dependent. The pricing browsing plan on each user is linear in each user’s
weighted degree; and the pricing and subsidizing plan on each user is linear in each
user’s Katz-Bonacich of degree 2.
The games with an asymmetrical interpersonal externality we study here are two
cases in between pricing one activity with the local network externality and pricing
two activities with symmetric interpersonal effects. Comparing our pricing browsing
plan with the network-independent uniform pricing plan for one activity with the local
network externality (Bloch and Que´rou (2013) and Candogan et al. (2012)), the pricing
plan on each user is network-dependent in our cases. The intrapersonal externalities
present in a linear form in the pricing browsing plan, but users’ behavior are linear
in their Katz-Bonacich centralities of a parameter depending on the intrapersonal ex-
ternality. It coincides with the case of Bloch and Que´rou (2013) and Candogan et al.
(2012).
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For pricing and subsidizing plan, the Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2 appear
in the cases where intrapersonal effects are cancelled out.
For future studies, two extension cases would be studied. A user’s friends on
social media could not only contain her/his friends in real life but also contain her/his
enemies, therefore, it is interesting to study how users distinguish different the content
to friends in different groups. Besides, we could study the case where the subsidized
content does not benefit users’ friends.
Moreover, the full characterization of the dual activities should be expected. These
include: (i) for how the exogenous factors affect the dual activities, it could be the cases
that one of the dual activities is affected, both activities are affected, or neither of the
activities are affected by exogenous factors; (ii) for the interpersonal externalities, we
could consider the cases with symmetrical/asymmetrical interpersonal effects which
are within each activity or cross-activity; (iii) there exist intrapersonal effects or not;
(iv) for the game participants, how many firms price and subsidize on the network, and
more real-life examples are needed for applications.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Centrality
Consider a scalar θ and a n× n symmetric matrix A such that n ∈ Z++ and I− θA is
invertible, then a matrix M is contracting and defined as:
M (A, θ) = (I− θA)−1 =
+∞∑
k=0
θkAk = I+ θA+ θ2A2 + ...+ θnAn + ...
If the symmetric matrix A is a network’s adjacency matrix G, a vector of Katz-
Bonacich centralities of all nodes in network G with local externality parameter θ
is defined as b (G, θ) = (I− θG)−1 1; and a vector of weighted Katz-Bonacich cen-
tralities of all nodes in network G is defined as bα (G, θ) = (I− θG)−1 α, in which
∀αi ∈ α, αi > 0 and ∃i 6= j ∈ N , αi 6= αj .
If A is G2, a vector of Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2 for all nodes in net-
work G with local externality parameter θ is defined as b (G2, θ) = (I− θG2)−1 1;
and a vector of weighted Katz-Bonacich centralities of degree 2 in network G is de-
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fined as bα (G2, θ) = (I− θG2)−1 α, in which ∀αi ∈ α, αi > 0 and ∃i 6= j ∈ N ,
αi 6= αj . For matrix G2, the entry in row i and column j is the number of paths of
length 2 between user i and user j in network G.
If A is the (υI+G)2 s.t. v ∈ R, a vector of quasi-Katz-Bonacich central-
ities of degree 2 of all nodes in network G with local externality parameter θ is
b
(
(υI+G)2 , θ
)
=
[
I− θ (υI+G)2]−1 1; and a vector of weighted Katz-Bonacich
centralities of degree 2 of all nodes on network G is defined as bα
(
(υI+G)2 , θ
)
=[
I− θ (υI+G)2]−1 α, in which ∀αi ∈ α, αi > 0 and ∃i 6= j ∈ N , αi 6= αj .
1.7.2 Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.1. We firstly check that the monopolist has no incentive
to choose a pricing plan p such that there exists an i for which pi ≥
∑
j∈N(i) tj/η
and vi = 0. Suppose the monopolist chooses p∗ such that there exist an i for which
p∗i =
∑
j∈N(i) tj/η and v
∗
i = 0; and p
∗ maximizes the monopolist’s profit denoted as
pi∗. The profit gained from user i is pi∗i = p
∗
i v
∗
i = 0 due to that vi = 0.
Consider a new price vector p′ =
(
p∗−i, p
′
i
)
in which ∃ > 0 such that p′i =
p∗i −  > 0. In p′, the pricing plan p′i on i is slightly smaller than the original pricing
plan p∗i ; for any other user, the pricing plan is the same as in p
∗. Therefore, user i’s
browsing time v′i = /β > 0. Then, the profit gained from i with pricing plan p
′
i is
pi′i = p
′
iv
′
i = p
′
i/β > 0 = pi
∗
i . For users except i, the pricing plans for them are the
same in p′−i = p
∗
−i, and it results in their same time spending on browsing v
′
−i = v
∗
−i.
Thus, the profit from users except user i are the same p′T−iv
′
−i = p
∗T
−iv
∗
−i. Comparing
the profit with p∗ and that with p′, we have pi′ = p′T−iv
′
−i+p
′
iv
′
i > p
∗T
−iv
∗
−i+p
∗
i v
∗
i = pi
∗,
which contradicts the assumption.
The F. O. Cs of the monopolist’s profit function pi = pT (Gα− ηβp) /β2 w.r.t. p
is:
∇pi = (Gα− 2ηβp) /β2 = 0
Solve∇pi = 0. We have p∗ = Gα/ (2ηβ) and v∗ = Gα/ (2β2). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.2. We check the sufficiency of the conditions.
Consider γ > 0. For any user i, ti ≥ αi/β. We firstly check that the monopolist
has no incentive to choose a vector p such that ∃i pi ≥
∑
j∈N(i) tj/η + γti/η and
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vi = 0. We fix p−i. There exists an  > 0 such that p′i =
∑
j∈N(i) tj/η+ γti/η−  > 0
and vi = /β > 0. Thus, the profit from agent i increases. User i’s browsing time
vi increases, which increases her/his creating time ti such that any j ∈ N (i), vj is
nondecreasing (vj could be zero with a large enough pj). Thus, the profit from any of
i’s friends is nondecreasing. Therefore, the total profit with pricing plan p′i is larger
than that of pi. Thus, for all i vi > 0, then ti > αi/β. Therefore, both t∗ and v∗
are unique and interior, and we can just use v = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα− βηp) to
solve the monopolist’ profit maximization problem.
Consider γ < 0. We prove the sufficiency of the conditions by contradiction. This
is to say, we prove that statement “if γ < 0, and for all i ((G+ γI)α)i > 0 and−α <
β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
< αi, the SPE does not have a unique and interior solution”
produces contradiction. The uniqueness has been proved by the strict concavity of
potential function ϕwith λmax (γG) < δ−1. We only need to check whether there exist
an interior solution. If γ < 0, condition that for all i β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
> −αi
could be rewritten as for all i
(
(I− γδG)−1 (βα− γ (G+ γI)α/2β))
i
> 0. If p =
(G+ γI) / (2ηβ), then t is interior. So is p by condition that for all i ((G+ γI)α)i >
0. By the condition that for all i β2δ
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)
i
< αi, for all i, ti < αi/β and
vi > 0. Pricing plan p = (G+ γI) / (2ηβ) satisfies pi’s F.O.C.s conditioning on an
interior solution of browsing time as v = δ (I− γδG)−1 (Gα + γα− ηβp). Thus,
we have interior solution under the given conditions, which contradicts the statement.
The more intuitive explanation is in the main body of the paper. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.3. We firstly prove the following lemma. Then, we show
the steps of solving the equilibrium.
Lemma 1.2. MatrixH (pi) = β−2
 −2ηβI
κG
κG
−2κβI
is negative definite, if and only
if λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ.
Proof. Matrix H (pi) is a Hemitian matrix, thus it is negative definite if and only if all
of its eigenvalue is negative. Therefore, we need to show that the largest eigenvalue of
H (pi) is negative.
We need to find the expression of λmax (H (pi)) in terms of λmax (G) to derive the
condition.
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Let λ (H (pi)) denote an eigenvalue H (pi) and yT =
(
yT1 ,y
T
2
)
denote λ (H (pi))’s
corresponding eigenvector, for which y1,y2 ∈ R|N |. Thus,
H (pi)y = λ (H (pi))y ⇐⇒ −2ηβy1 + κGy2 = β
2λ (H (pi))y1
κGy1 − 2κβy2 = β2λ (H (pi))y2
.
Solve the two systems of linear equations above simultaneously, resulting in:
κ2G2y1 =
(
β2λ (H (pi)) + 2ηβ
) (
β2λ (H (pi)) + 2κβ
)
y1 (1.12)
Therefore, vector y1 is an eigenvector G2. Vector y1 is also an eigenvector of
G; and eigenvalue of G2 λ (G2) is equal to λ2 (G). To prove that, suppose x is an
eigenvector of G, then Gx = λ (G)x. Thus, G2x = λ (G)Gx = λ2 (G)x. Then,
we have κ2G2y1 = κ2λ2 (G)y1. Combining eq. (1.12) with the previous sentence,
we have (β2λ (H (pi)) + 2ηβ) (β2λ (H (pi)) + 2κβ)y1 = κ2λ2 (G)y1.
Then, we have a quadratic function of λ (H (pi)) as:
(
β2λ (H (pi)) + 2ηβ
) (
β2λ (H (pi)) + 2κβ
)
= κ2λ2 (G) .
Solve the quadratic equation of λ (H (pi)) in terms of β, κ, η and λ (G), and we have:
λ (H (pi)) = ± 1
β2
√
β2 (η − κ)2 + κ2λ2 (G)− η + κ
β
.
We have the largest eigenvalue of H (pi) λmax (H (pi)) with positive sign of square root
in the expression above and λ (G) = λmax (G). The expression of λmax (H (pi)) is as
follows:
λmax (H (pi)) =
1
β2
√
β2 (η − κ)2 + κ2λ2max (G)−
η + κ
β
.
Solving λmax (H (pi)) < 0, we have λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ. Q.E.D.
We solve the equilibrium now. If γ = 0, user i’s utility function with qi Uˆ is:
Uˆ ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi) = αiti − 1
2
βt2i + κqiti + vi
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − 1
2
βv2i − ηpivi.
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The F. O. C.s of Uˆ are:
∂Uˆ
∂ti
= αi + κqi − βti = 0;
∂Uˆ
∂vi
=
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − ηpi − βvi = 0.
Solve ∂Uˆ/∂ti = 0 and ∂Uˆ/∂vi = 0 simultaneously, and write them in matrix
form. We have:
t =
1
β
α +
κ
β
q (1.13)
and
v =
1
β2
Gα +
κ
β2
Gq− η
β
p. (1.14)
Combining the monopolist’s profit function pi = −qT t + pTv, we have the profit
function as:
pi = −qT
(
α
β
+
κq
β
)
+ pT
(
Gα
β2
+
κGq
β2
− ηp
β
)
.
We use a vector xT =
(
pT ,qT
)
, Iu,l =
 I
0
0
0
, Ib,r =
 0
0
0
I
, Iu,r = 0
0
I
0
 and B =
 G
0
0
G
, the profit function is now:
pi = − 1
β
xT Ib,r
 α
α
+ 1
β2
xT Iu,lB
 α
α
− κ
β
xT Ib,rx+
κ
β2
xT Iu,rBx− η
β
xT Iu,lx.
The Hessian matrix of pi is:
H (pi) = −2κ
β
Ib,r − 2η
β
Iu,l +
κ
β2
Iu,rB+
κ
β2
ITu,rB.
Equivalently,
H (pi) =
1
β2
 −2ηβI
κG
κG
−2κβI
 .
By Lemma 1.2, if and only if λmax (G) < 2β
√
η/κ, λmax (H (pi)) < 0. Thus, the
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H (pi) is negative definite. We have a unique maximum of profit function. The first
derivatives of pi with respect to x is:
∂pi
∂x
= − 1
β
 0
α
+ 1
β2
 Gα
α
+ 1
β2
 −2ηβI
κG
κG
−2κβI
x.
Solve ∂pi/∂x = 0, and we have
p∗ =
1
4ηβ
G
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α
and
q∗ =
1
2κ
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α− 1
κ
α.
Therefore, by the best responses of creating time and browsing time, i. e., eq. (1.13)
and eq. (1.14) and, p∗ and q∗, users’ creating time are given by:
t∗ =
1
2β
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α,
and their browsing time are given by:
v∗ =
1
4β2
G
(
I− κ
4ηβ2
G2
)−1
α.
The interior solutions must satisfy the F.O.C.s and be positive. Then, the sufficient
and necessary condition is for all i, for all i
((
I− κ (4ηβ2)−1 G2 − I
)−1
α
)
i
>
0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4. For the monopolist’s profit, consider a new potential
function Φ:
Φ (x,G) = xT (G+ γI)α− 1
2
xT (I− γδG)x.
By the positive definiteness of I − γδG and I − γδG′, Φ (x,G) and Φ (x′,G′)
are strictly concave functions.21 The maximizers of Φ (x∗,G) and Φ (x′∗,G′) are
interior, then the values of potential functions Φ (x∗,G) and Φ (x′∗,G′) correspond
to the monopolist’s profits pi∗ on network G and pi′∗ on network G′ respectively. As
21See Footnote 16 for the proof of that the product of two positive definite matrices is positive definite.
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lij /∈ G and G′ = G+ lij , we have
Φ (x∗,G′)− Φ (x∗,G) = x∗iαj + x∗jαi + γδx∗jx∗i
= x∗i
(
αj + γδx
∗
j/2
)
+ x∗j (αi + γδx
∗
i /2)
> x∗i (αj + γδαj/ (2β)) + x
∗
j (αi + γδαi/ (2β)) .
If γδ/ (2β) > −1, we have
Φ (x∗,G′)− Φ (x∗,G) > x∗i (αj + γδαj/ (2β)) + x∗j (αi + γδαi/ (2β)) > 0.
Then, by Φ (x′∗,G′) ≥ Φ (x∗,G′) > Φ (x∗,G). Therefore, pi′∗ > pi∗.
We now discuss the condition γδ/ (2β) > −1. Consider the condition for posi-
tive definiteness of matrix (I− γδG). Since the smallest eigenvalue of a undirected
graph is smaller than or equal to −1, we have γδ > −1. Therefore, if β > 1/2,
γδ/ (2β) > −1. If β < 1/2, then we solve the γδ/2β > −1, which results in
(4β)−1 −
√
(16β2)−1 + β2 < γ < 0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5. By condition that ψ (x,C) and ψ (x′,C′) are strictly
concave, and the maximizers of ψ (x,C) and ψ (x′,C′) are interior, then ψ (x∗,C)
and ψ (x′∗,C′) correspond to
∑
t∗i and
∑
t′∗i respectively. The partial derivative of
ψ w.r.t. Cii is negative: ∂ψ/∂Cii = −x2i /2 + γδ
∑
j∈N(i) xixj/2 < 0. Therefore,
ψ (x∗,C) < ψ (x∗,C′), since C ′ii = (α
′
i)
−1 ≤ (αi)−1 = Cii. Thus, ψ (x′∗,C′) ≥
ψ (x∗,C′) > ψ (x∗,C). Therefore,
∑
t′∗i >
∑
t∗i . Q.E.D.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.5.1. Consider a new potential function φ:
φ (x,D) = xT1− 1
2
xTD (I− γδG)x,
where D is a diagonal matrix and Dii =
(∑
j∈N(i) αj + γαi
)−1
. We have matrix D′
with D′ii =
(∑
j∈N(i) α
′
j + γα
′
i
)−1
. If matrix (I− γδG) is positive definite, Hessian
matrices of φ (x,D) and φ (x′,D′) –H (φ (x,D)) = D (I− γδG)+(I− γδG)D and
H (φ (x,D′)) = D′ (I− γδG) + (I− γδG)D′ are positive definite.22
22 See Footnote 16 for the proof of that the product of two positive definite matrices is positive
definite.
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Potential functions φ (x,D) and φ (x′,D′) are strictly concave and the maximizers
of φ (x,D) and φ (x′,D′) are interior. Thus, φ (x∗,D) and φ (x′∗,D′) correspond
to
∑
v∗i and
∑
v′∗i respectively. The partial derivative of φ w.r.t. Dii is negative:
∂φ/∂Dii = −x2i /2 + γδ
∑
j∈N(i) xixj/2 < 0. Since D
′
ii > φ (x
∗,D), it follows
that φ (x∗,D) < φ (x∗,D′). Thus, we have φ (x∗,D) < φ (x∗,D′) ≤ φ (x′∗,D′).
Therefore,
∑
v∗i <
∑
v′∗i .
For the monopolist’s profit, consider the potential function Φ (x,α). Potential
functions Φ (x,α) and Φ (x′,α′) are strictly concave functions and the maximizers
of Φ (x,α) and Φ (x′,α′) are interior. The values of Φ (x∗,α) and Φ (x′∗,α′) corre-
spond to the monopolist’s profit pi∗ with α and pi′∗ with α′ respectively. We show that
Φ (x∗,α) < Φ (x∗,α′); then, by Φ (x∗,α′) ≤ Φ (x′∗,α′), Φ (x∗,α) < Φ (x′∗,α′) is
straightforward.
Consider
Φ (x∗,α′)− Φ (x∗,α) = (α′ −α)T (G+ γI)2 (I− γδG)−1 α.
For both i and j such that
∑
k∈N(i) αk + γαi ≤
∑
k∈N(i) α
′
k + γα
′
i and
∑
k∈N(j) αk +
γαj ≤
∑
k∈N(j) α
′
k + γα
′
j , then
(
(α′ −α)T (G+ γI)
)
i,j
≥ 0. For any user k who
is either i’s or j’s friend, the pricing plan p′k is strictly increasing. Equivalently, for
k ∈ {N (i) , N (j)},
(
(α′ −α)T (G+ γI)
)
k
> 0. Combined with the condition that
any user’s browsing time is positive, we have:
(α′ −α)T (G+ γI) (G+ γI) (I− γδG)−1 α > 0.
Thus, Φ (x∗,α) < Φ (x∗,α′) ≤ Φ (x′∗,α′), which implies pi′∗ > pi∗.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.6. Let pi∗ and pi′∗ denote the monopolist’s profit from net-
work G and G′ respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume α = 1.
If γ = 0, by Proposition 1.1 and the monopolist’s profit function pi = pTv, the
monopolist’s profit from network G pi∗ is equal to 1TG21/ (4β3η); and her/his profit
from network G′ pi′∗ is equal to 1TG′21/ (4β3η). For the term 1TG21 in pi∗, it can
be reorganized as |E (G) | +∑i di (di − 1). Since G′ is with higher variance of de-
gree than G but the same mean, we have
∑
i d
′
i (d
′
i − 1) >
∑
di (di − 1) such that
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1TG21 < 1TG′21. Therefore, pi∗ < pi′∗.
If γ = 0, the monopolist’s profit from network G by discrimination pricing across
each node is given by pi∗ = δαT (G+ γI)2 (I− γδG)−1 α/ (4β). Reorganizing the
equation, it yields
pi∗ =
β3δ
(4γ2)
αT (I− γδG)−1 α− β
(4γ2)
αTα− 1
(4βγ)
αT (G+ γI)α.
Then, the profit from network G′ is :
pi′∗ =
β3δ
(4γ2)
αT (I− γδG′)−1 α− β
(4γ2)
αTα− 1
(4βγ)
αT (G′ + γI)α.
Recall that |V (G) | = |V (G′) | and |E (G) | = |E (G′) |. Compare the second and
third terms of pi∗ and pi′∗, it yields
−β
(4γ2)
αTα− 1
(4βγ)
αT (G+ γI)α =
−β
(4γ2)
αTα− 1
(4βγ)
αT (G′ + γI)α.
Hence, the comparison of pi∗ and pi′∗ depends on the sum of users’ Katz-Bonacich
centralities.
Since α = 1, the first term of pi∗ αT (I− γδG)−1 α is equal to 1T1+ γδ1TG1+
γ2δ21TG21+O (γ3δ3); and the first term of pi′∗ αT (I− γδG′)−1 α is equal to 1T1+
γδ1TG′1+ γ2δ21TG′21+O (γ3δ3). We compare the two expression above. The first
terms of them are the same, since 1T1 = |V (G) | = |V (G′) |; the second terms
γδ1TG1 and γδ1TG′1 are also equal to each other, since 1TG1 = |E (G) | =
|E (G′) | = 1TG′1. We consider the third term γ2δ21TG21 and reorganize it as
γ2δ2 (|E (G) |+∑i di (di − 1)). Since G′ is with higher variance of degree than G
but the same mean, we have
∑
i d
′
i (d
′
i − 1) >
∑
di (di − 1) such that γ2δ21TG21 <
γ2δ21TG′21. Therefore, pi∗ < pi′∗. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.7. For the monopolist’s profit, we have the first derivative
of Φ w.r.t γ:
∂Φ
∂γ
=
∑
i∈N
xiαi + δ
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N(i)
xixj/2 > 0
If γ < γ′, Φ (x∗, γ) < Φ (x∗, γ′). Thus, Φ (x′∗, γ′) ≥ Φ (x∗, γ′) > Φ (x∗, γ). There-
fore, pi′∗ > pi∗.
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User’s utility is given by:
U∗ =
3
8β
α◦2 +
βδ
8
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)◦2 + βδ2
8
(
G (I− γδG)−1 α)◦2 .
Take the first derivative with respect to γ on U∗, then it follows that
∂U
∂γ
=
γβδ3
2
(
G (I− γδG)−1 α)◦2 + βδ2
8
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2
(
G2 (I− γδG)−2 α)◦2
+
γβδ2
4
(
(I− γδG)−1 α)◦2 + βδ
8
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2
(
G (I− γδG)−2 α)◦2 .
By checking the the derivatives, we have (∂U/∂γ)i > 0, provided γ > 0 or γ → 0−.
Also, it holds that ∂pi/∂γ > 0 when γ > 0.
Solve
[
(I− γδG)−1]′, then
[
(I− γδG)−1]′
=
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2
(
G+ 2γδG2 + ...+ (γδ)|N |−1 G|N | − ...
)
=
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2G
(
(I− γδG)−1 + γδG ((I− γδG)−1 + γδG (..) ..))
=
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2G (I− γδG)−1
(
I+ γδG+ ...+ (γδ)|N |−1 G|N |−1..
)
=
(
β2 + γ2
)
δ2G (I− γδG)−2 .
Q.E.D.
1.7.3 Supplements for Section 1.4 – Generalization
We have the utility function Uˆ denoted as follows:
Uˆ ((ti, vi) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi) = αiti− 1
2
βt2i +κqiti + vi
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − 1
2
βv2i − ηpivi + γtivi.
(1.15)
We take the first partial derivative of Uˆ w.r.t vi such that
∂Uˆi
∂vi
=
∑
j∈N(i)
tj − βvi − ηpi + γti = 0
Solve the equation above, and we have user i’s browsing time as a function of
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her/his creating time ti:
v (ti) =
∑
j∈N(i) tj − ηpi + γti
β
. (1.16)
Assume that v (ti) > 0. We replace vi in eq. (1.15) with v (ti) denoted as eq. (1.16):
Uˆ ((ti, v (ti)) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi) = αiti − 1
2
βt2i + κqiti +
1
2β
 ∑
j∈N(i)
tj − ηpi + γti
2 .
(1.17)
The F. O. C of eq. (1.17) w.r.t ti is as follows:
dUˆ ((ti, v (ti)) ; t−i,v−i, pi, qi)
dti
= αi − βti + κqi + γ
β
 ∑
j∈N(i)
tj − ηpi + γti
 = 0
Therefore, we have user i’s best response of creating time with qi and pi as ti =
δβαi + δκβqi + γδ
∑
j∈N(i) tj − γδηpi, if ti, v (ti) > 0. Note that: if γ > 0, v (ti) > 0
implies that ti > αi/β + κqi/β; if γ < 0 , v (ti) > 0 implies that ti < αi/β + κqi/β.
Assume that for all k ∈ N , tk, v (tk) > 0. In matrix form, we have t = γδGt +
δ (βα− ηγp+ κβq). We take the mixed partial derivatives of Uˆi and Uˆj respectively.
Thus, ∂2Uˆi/∂ti∂tj = ∂2Uˆj/∂ti∂tj = γgij/β, which satisfies the condition of Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996). Therefore, we have the potential function ϕ is given by:
ϕ (t;α,p,q,G) = δtT (βα− ηγp+ κβq)− 1
2
tT (I− γδG) t,
in which t satisfies Kuhn-Tucker condition:
(i) Assume γ > 0, then ti ≥ αi/β + κqi/β. If ϕ is strictly concave, then ti =
αi/β + κqi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti ≤ 0, and ti > αi/β + κqi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti = 0; if ϕ is
convex, for all i ti → +∞.
(ii) Assume γ < 0, then 0 ≤ ti ≤ αi/β. ti = 0 ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti ≤ 0, 0 < ti <
αi/β + κqi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti = 0, and ti = αi/β + κqi/β ⇒ ∂ϕ/∂ti ≥ 0.23
If λmax (γG) < δ−1, H (ϕ) is negative definite. Then ϕ is strictly concave and
23If γ < 0 and for some user i ti = αi/β + κqi/β, then user i’s browsing time binds such that
vi = v (ti) = 0.
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there exists a unique maximum of ϕ. Assume that t and v are interior. We have
t = δ (I− γδG)−1 (βα− ηγp+ κβq)
and
v =
βδ
γ
(I− γδG)−1 (βα− ηγp+ κβq)− 1
γ
α− κ
γ
q.
Replace t and v in the profit function:
pi =− qT δ (I− γδG)−1 (βα− ηγp+ κβq)
+
δβ
γ
pT (I− γδG)−1 (βα− ηγp+ κβq)− 1
γ
pTα− κ
γ
pTq.
We use a vector xT =
(
pT ,qT
)
, Iu,l =
 I
0
0
0
, Ib,r =
 0
0
0
I
, Iu,r = 0
0
I
0
 and B =
 (I− γδG)−1
0
0
(I− γδG)−1
, the profit function is now:
pi =xTB
−δβIb,r
 α
α
+ δηγIu,rx− δκβIb,rx

+ xTB
δβ2
γ
Iu,l
 α
α
− δβηIu,lx+ δκβ2
γ
Iu,rx
− 1
γ
xT Iu,l
 α
α
− κ
γ
xT Iu,rx.
The Hessian matrix is:
H (pi) = δ (I− δγG)−1
 −2ηβI
γ (η + κ) I+ κG
γ (η + κ) I+ κG
−2κβI
 .
Assume that −γ2 (1 + η/κ) + 2β|γ|√η/κ > 0.24 The largest eigenvalue of H (pi)
is negative, if and only if λmax (γG) < −γ2 (1 + η/κ) + 2β|γ|
√
η/κ.25
24If −γ2 (1 + η/κ) + 2β|γ|√η/κ < 0, then H (pi)is not negative definite. The profit function does
not have a unique maximum point.
25Using the same technique in the proof of Proposition 1.3:
λ (H (pi)) = ±
√
β2 (η − κ)2 + [γ (η + κ) + κλ (G)]2
1− δλ (γG) −
β (η + κ)
1− δλ (γG) ,
such that:
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If λmax (γG) < min
{
δ−1,−γ2 (1 + η/κ) + 2β|γ|√η/κ}, we have unique and
interior solution of SPE. Let W = γ (1 + η/κ) I+G. Solve dpi/dx = 0 resulting in:
p∗ =
(
− γ
2βκ
I+
1
4βη
W
)(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α
and
q∗ =
(
1
2κ
I− γ
4β2κ
W
)(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α− 1
κ
α;
and the users’ creating time and browsing time are:
t∗ =
1
2β
(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α
and
v∗ =
1
4β2
W
(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α.
If γ > 0, the following assumption must hold to ensure that ∀i, ti, vi, pi, qi > 0:
Assumption 1.1. Assume γ > 0. If and only if for all i,
(i)
((−γI+ κ (2η)−1 W) (I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2)−1 α)
i
> 0;
(ii)
((
I/2− γ (4β2)−1 W
)(
I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2
)−1
α
)
i
> αi.
The first condition of Assumption 1.1 ensures that every entry p∗ is positive, and
the second condition of Assumption 1.1 ensures that every entry of q∗ is positive.
If the intrapersonal substitutes appear γ < 0, then the following assumption must
hold to ensure that for all i, ti, vi, pi, qi > 0:
Assumption 1.2. If γ < 0, if and only if for all i,
(i) assume γ > 0,
λmax (H (pi)) =
√
β2 (η − κ)2 + [γ (η + κ) + κλmax (G)]2
1− γδλmax (G) −
β (η + κ)
1− γδλmax (G) ,
in which λmax (G) < −γ (1 + η/κ) + 2β
√
η/κ implies λmax (H (pi)) < 0.
(ii) assume γ < 0,
λmax (H (pi)) =
√
β2 (η − κ)2 + [γ (η + κ) + κλmin (G)]2
1− γδλmin (G) −
β (η + κ)
1− γδλmin (G) ,
where λmin (G) > −γ (1 + η/κ)− 2β
√
η/κ implies λmax (H (pi)) < 0.
Therefore, if λmax (γG) < −γ2 (1 + η/κ) + 2β|γ|
√
η/κ, we have λmax (H (pi)) < 0.
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(i)
((−γI+ κ (2η)−1 W) (I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2)−1 α)
i
> 0;
(ii)
((
I/2− γ (4β2)−1 W
)(
I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2
)−1
α
)
i
> αi.
(iii)
((
I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2
)−1
α
)
i
> 0
(iv)
(
W
(
I− κ (4β2η)−1 W2
)−1
α
)
i
> 0.
In details, the first condition ensures all the entries in p∗ are positive; the second
one ensures evey entry in q∗ is positive; the third and fourth conditions ensure t∗, and
v∗’s entries to be positive respectively.
Now we have the proposition:
Proposition 1.8. Assume that ζ = −γ2 (1 + η/κ)+2β|γ|√η/κ > 0 and λmax (γG) <
min {δ−1, ζ}. If and only if either (i) Assumption 1.1 or (ii) Assumption 1.2 holds, in
the unique SPE, the monopolist’s pricing strategy is:
p∗ =
(
− γ
2βκ
I+
1
4βη
W
)(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α
and
q∗ =
(
1
2κ
I− γ
4β2κ
W
)(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α− 1
κ
α;
and the users’ creating time and browsing time are:
t∗ =
1
2β
(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α and v∗ =
1
4β2
W
(
I− κ
4β2η
W2
)−1
α.
Chapter 2
Social Integration and the Acculturation Game
2.1 Introduction
Social integration is of great concern in multicultural societies. The fundamental issue
of marginalization and separation of societies is the miscoordination in the dimension
of culture between the members of the societies. The miscoordination results from the
issues of group identity and members’ lack of ability to coordinate with each other.1
An example of the second issue is that immigrants or familial immigrants, who look for
a position in mainstream societies, agree on the professional, economic, and academic
ways of the mainstream life, but they need to improves their ability to coordinate
by learning the cultural knowledge of mainstream to fit in.2 This paper considers a
framework where an individual’s payoffs from coordination depends on her/his ability
to understand others individuals have the willingness to improve their own ability to
interact and coordinate with the others, but experiences different types of costs in order
to do so.
Interaction and coordination are the essential ways for individuals to participate
in social and economic life.3 However, interaction and coordination are not culturally
free. Cultural knowledge helps individuals to build a better understanding and be more
predictive of their coordinators’ or colleagues’ behaviors, which enable individuals to
1The majority of theoretical economic studies on culture issue with aspect to economic interaction
in public life of multicultural societies are based on the identity theory(Akerlof and Kranton (2000)).
This paper studies the effects of improvement of members’ ability to coordinate on social integration.
Please see Section 2.2 for detailed discussion about these two issues.
2Seminal political philosophic study Kymlicka (1995) points out that individuals, such as immigrant
or familial immigrants, seek for greater recognition of ethnic identities, but they want to participate in
the modern industrialized form of social life.
3Rawls (2009) states that: “a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage”.
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make suitable responses in social coordination. We think of cultural knowledge as the
knowledge about local social context, which facilitates individuals’ social interaction
and coordination. It includes: the proficiency in local languages, the common beliefs,
the organization of public life, historical events, current affairs etc.
Individuals who live in a cultural social context different from their origins, need to
cope with acculturative stress and exert efforts to overcome the difficulties in learning
the mainstream culture (Sam and Berry (2006)). Acculturative stress is the negative
emotion individuals feel when they experience failures of social interaction due to
cultural differences. Individuals experience less stress when they become adaptive.
However, the more cultural knowledge an individual has, the more difficult it is for
her/him to gain new.
Psychologists use “acculturation” to capture individuals’ psychological, cognitive
and behavioral changes in the process of cultural adaptation (Sam and Berry (2006)).
We use “acculturation game” to propose a stylized model through a game-theoretical
approach to describe the behavior of individuals, who acquire knowledge about the
social context to improve their ability to coordinate with each other. In the model,
we use the interval from zero to one to represent the cultural knowledge spectrum of
the society. Each agent is endowed with cultural knowledge from zero to a certain
level and derives utilities from interacting with others. The utilities derived by each
of the two interacting agents are proportional to the length of the cultural knowledge
spectrum they have in common; that is to say, the minimum of the two agents’ cultural
knowledge spectrum dominates the utilities of interacting for both of them. Agents can
expand their cultural knowledge with cost. We are interested in what level of cultural
knowledge each agent chooses to gain. Further, a cultural test, as a type of integration
policies, sets a minimum cultural knowledge level for all agents; we are interested in
when this policy improves social welfare.
We analyze payoff dominant equilibria of three cases of acculturation game with
different types of marginal cost functions. Each of the three cases corresponds to the
situation where agents experience: (i) difficulties, (ii) stress, or (iii) both difficulties
and stress in learning.
In Section 2.4.1, we study the case where agents experience difficulties only. This
case corresponds to the game with strictly increasing marginal cost functions, which
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capture increasing difficulties for agents to gain new knowledge. In equilibria, the
agents endowed with low levels of cultural knowledge learn, and those endowed with
high levels do not. This case applies to the socialization of children. Children interact
with their parents and playmates in the process of socialization, by which the children
gain cultural identities for coordination. Children acquire their first languages at their
earliest stage of socialization. The seminal study by Brown (1973) states that a child’s
prelinguistic grasp of concepts and meanings through interacting with her/his parents
aids her/his language acquisition. He also mentions that there was no evidence that
children’s speech into lines is impelled by any kind of pressure.4
In Section 2.4.2, we study the case where agents experience stress only. This
case corresponds to the game with strictly decreasing marginal cost functions, which
captures the decreasing of stress experienced by agents, as they become more adap-
tive to the dominant culture. The second case applies to the acculturation of second-
generation immigrant adolescents. The second-generations have easy access to cul-
tural knowledge of the mainstreams from their education systems; however, the culture
parts of the second-generations’ upbringing are closer to their parents’ origins, which
are different from the dominant mainstream culture. Therefore, the second-generation
immigrant adolescents experience high levels of acculturative stress.5 In equilibria, the
agents endowed with high levels of cultural knowledge acquire all cultural knowledge
and the others do not acquire any. The results of equilibria can be interpreted as the
marginalization or separation of agents endowed with low levels of cultural knowl-
edge.
In Section 2.4.3, we study the game with U-shaped marginal cost functions. A
U-shaped function is the sum of two functions such that one of the two is strictly
increasing and the other is strictly decreasing. Agents experience both difficulties
and acculturative stress in order to learn. In equilibria, only the agents endowed with
middle levels of cultural knowledge learn, while both the agents endowed with low and
high levels of cultural knowledge do not. The third case applies to the acculturation
of first-generation immigrants: they experience acculturative stress and difficulties in
learning in social and economic life.6
4To the best of our knowledge, this statement still holds.
5Hovey and King (1996) found that one fourth of second-generation immigrants adolescents of
Latino, who answers their questionnaire, reported critical levels of depression due to acculturative stress.
6Empirical studies of sociology and economics show the acculturation outcomes of first- and second-
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For policy implication in Section 2.5, we consider well-defined marginal cost func-
tions. In the case where agents experience difficulties only, the optimal policy level
decreases with the difficulties in learning, and increases with the proportions of agents
endowed with higher levels of cultural knowledge. In the case where agents experience
only stress, a low level policy can induce all agents to acquire all cultural knowledge,
if there exist some agents acquiring all cultural knowledge without policy. In the cases
where agents experience both difficulties and stress, we use a diagram to show the
policy level depends on difficulties in learning, levels of acculturative stress and the
population distributions of agents’ endowed knowledge levels. In the cases where the
policy does not improve social welfare, agents experience high levels of acculturative
stress.
2.2 Literature Review
Integration policy refers to the policy which concerns immigrants after their arrival
at the host countries. For the policy specifically concerning citizenship awarding, it
contains birthright citizenship, descendent citizenship and naturalization citizenship.
Host countries award or abandon certain rights of citizenship over time depending on
their histories and current affairs. Algan et al. (2010) review the integration policies
of the UK, France and Germany, and find that the UK takes a positive multicultural
approach with a high tolerance of the cultural differences of immigrants’ original ways
of life.7 The UK began to impose tests on candidates who seek for citizenship in 2005,
due to the fact that the they did not join the wider society beyond their communities.
France and Germany, although starting with different approaches, have a convergence
to adopt the same test policy for citizenship. The test is also adopted for naturalization
citizenship by other migration counties such as Australia, Canada, the USA etc. The
tests are criticized widely for their content. For example, the citizenship test “Life in
the UK test” is criticized for its inconsistency, obsolescence, and gender imbalance
generation immigrants are different due to their main acculturative ages and education backgrounds with
cross-country evidence (Zhou (1997), Portes and Zhou (2012) and Algan et al. (2010)).
7For the political framework of multicultural societies, Kymlicka (1995) thinks that: immigrants
voluntarily choose their movements to host countries; they seek the right for ethnic identities but agree
on economic, professional, academic interactive ways in the mainstream. Indigenous people seek the
right of self-governance. Refugees’ willingness is hard to identify, as the time of returning to their home
countries is indecisive. We focus on the individuals who choose to integrate whichever group they come
from, since they could make different choices from the majorities of their groups.
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(Brooks (2013)).
Culture is widely studied across the whole spectrum of social sciences. The word
‘culture’ has its own definitional issues in academic research. As Throsby (2001)
stated, “ ‘culture’ is a word which is employed in a variety of senses in everyday use
but without a tangible and generally agreed core meaning”. Even we narrow down
the meaning of ‘culture’ to the aspect of the variety of human behavior in social life
across different groups, economic researches on culture-dependent outcomes diverse
with analyses across psychology, individual, group levels with different assumptions
and approaches.
A strand of theoretical literature considers the effect of cultural/ethnic identities
and peer effects of identities on the resilience of conforming to social norms/social
context of the mainstream. The literature covers the studies on cultural identities
on students’ performance across different ethnicity in school(Akerlof and Kranton
(2002)); and the peer effects on job seekers’ job finding outcome in labor market(Battu
et al. (2007)). However, in the process of cultural adaption, individuals face other
identity-free difficulties for individuals in order to improve their status in social con-
text. For example, it is hard for a good number of nonnative English speaking scholars
to write language satisfying papers, even after they spend many years living in English
speaking countries.
Another strand of theoretical literature with premises that family is the main rea-
son of resilience of mainstream culture, as parents choose their children’s culture traits
with imperfect empathy (Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Bisin and Verdier (2011)).
Some cultural related preference or social norms fit into their context are related to
highly family-dependent life practices, such as fertility practices. Moreover, the set-
ting that parents’ choice of time spending with children is key to determine children’s
cultural traits does not taking into account the mutual interest of both parents and chil-
dren to spend time together. In other words, children might not want to spend time
with their parents. This chapter is more focused on the public life of individuals, and
is to uncover how social coordination as the nature of society will affect individuals’
choice of the degree of conforming to mainstream public life.
The existence of culture dependent but not cultural identity dependent factors on
coordination outcomes are observed in experimental and labor economic studies on
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intercultural interaction; and they are not integrated into theoretical analysis of mi-
croeconomics. Experimental study conducted by Jackson and Xing (2014) observes
payoff differences in cross-cultural coordination without revealing the cultural iden-
tities of the players: participants with American and Indian cultural backgrounds are
asked to play a revised coordination game, and they do not know the cultural back-
ground of the one they play against with. Their results show that the expected payoff
of individuals is higher if the one they play against with is from the same culture.
For empirical studies, seminal study by Chiswick (1978) shows that there are
earning gaps between immigrants and native born individuals; however, the gaps are
closed, and immigrants’ earnings surpass the natives’ after immigrants’ several years
of living experience in the host countries. Further, a number of labor economic stud-
ies emphasize the positive effects of language proficiency on immigrants’ earnings
assimilation.8 There are ambiguities of the effects on income is culture-dependent or
culture identity dependent. In other words, it is so hard to say whether the first genera-
tion immigrants at least partially change their cultural identities or not in their cultural
adaption. However, we can conclude that the ability of the first-generation immigrants
to fit in the society have improved.
The theoretical economic literature on behavior assimilation from a coordination
perspective, which is identity-free, is of two strands. One strand of literature studies
the evolution of social convention, and the other strand of literature studies network
effects on the convergence of consensus. These studies do not apply to the culture-
related issues of social integration. Seminal theoretical study by Young (1993) ana-
lyzes the evolution of social conventions by studying a coordination game played by
many matched pairs of agents randomly drawn from a population. Their behavior is
self-enforcing due to utility maximization.9 He shows that the social convention which
is one equilibrium of many can be achieved dynamically. However, modern social in-
teraction and coordination are vastly connected with belief, attitude and behavior in a
cultural aspect, such that individuals or players’ cost is not only the loss of no cooper-
ation, but also the cost of learning. Our study takes the outcomes of evolution of social
conventions as given and focuses on individuals’ cost of learning associated with stress
8 Weiermair (1976), Kossoudji (1988), Dustmann (1994), Dustmann (1997), Chiswick and Miller
(1995), Beenstock (1996), Chiswick (1998), Gonzalez (2000), Hayfron (2001), Berman et al. (2003)
etc.
9See also Young (1996), Crawford and Haller (1990), and Crawford (1995).
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and difficulties. Golub and Jackson (2012) show the network effects of homophily on
the convergence of consensus: it takes more time to convergent to a consensus in a
network with higher densities of links within groups than those among groups. We
show that the assimilation of behaviors within the whole society in a cultural aspect is
hard to achieve due to the cost in learning even without network effects.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.3 introduces the
model. Section 2.4 shows payoff dominant equilibria with different marginal cost
functions. Section 2.5 analyzes the policy and social welfare. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.3 The Model
Consider a set of agents N in a society. For agent i ∈ N , she/he is born with a
type θi ∈ Θ where Θ = {θ | 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1} is the cultural knowledge spectrum of the
society; and [0, θi] is the endowed cultural knowledge spectrum of agent i. An agent
with born type 1 is fully adaptive to the cultural aspect of society; and an agent with
type 0 is born as “blank slates”, or she/he is totally foreign to the society.10 θi is
independently and identically distributed on Θ. The cumulative population distribution
function w.r.t agents’ born types is continuous and defined as F (θ) :=
∫ θ
0
f(x)dx
in which f : Θ → R+ is the population density distribution function. Cumulative
distribution function F (θ) is common knowledge in the game.
Agent i’s action set isA (θi) = {ai | θi ≤ ai ≤ 1}. Agent i expands her/his cultural
knowledge spectrum from [0, θi] to [0, ai], if ai > θi; otherwise, agent i stays with
her/his born cultural spectrum. In the game, agent i meets a fixed number of other
agents who are independently drawn from F . The utilities agent i derives, when she/he
meets agent j, are the length of the cultural knowledge spectrum they have in common,
which is min (ai, aj). As shown in Figure 2.1, even though agent i and agent j have
willingness to improve their interaction and coordination, their utilities are bounded
by agent i’s ability to make agent j understand or to understand agent j (Dustmann
(1994)).
The cost to choose ai is
C (ai, θi) = c (ai)− c (θi) ,
10Locke (1690) describes the mind at birth as blank slates.
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Figure 2.1 Cultural Knowledge Spectrum
in which c : [0, 1]→ R+ and c (·) is strictly increasing and differentiable. Consider the
marginal cost function such that ∂C (ai, θi) /∂ai = dc (ai) /dai. Thus, the marginal
cost for each agent is independent from her/his born type. We rewrite it as mc (a) =
dc (a) /da. The independence of marginal cost from agents’ born types implies that
the learning opportunities are equal for all agents in acquiring cultural knowledge on
a certain interval of the spectrum.11
As mentioned in the introduction, we study three types of marginal cost function;
then, we use mci (·), mcd (·) and mcu (·) to denote strictly increasing, strictly decreas-
ing and U-shaped marginal cost functions respectively. For mcu (·) formally, there
exists a θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that mcu (·) strictly decreases at interval [0, θ∗) and strictly
increases at interval (θ∗, 1].
We normalize the number of agents with whom agent i meets. Given a profile of
actions of agents excluding i denoted as a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}A (θj), the utilities agent i
deriving by choosing ai are the difference between expected payoff of interacting with
other agents Ea−i (min {ai, a−i}) and cost C (ai, θi). Agent i’s utility function is:
u (ai, θi, a−i) := Ea−i (min {ai, a−i})− C (ai, θi) . (2.1)
We focus on pure strategy symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Then, the strategy
could be present as s : Θ → A (Θ) such that s is a mapping from agent i’s born type
θi to i’s action set A (θi) = {si | θi ≤ si ≤ 1}. Therefore, we can rewrite eq. (2.1) as:
u (si, θi, s, f) =
∫ 1
0
min (si, s (θ)) f (θ) dθ − C (si, θi) . (2.2)
We use ui to denote user i’s utility function interchangeably with u (·, θi, s, f) in the
following discussion.
11In Chapter 3, we consider another type of marginal cost function, for which agents’ marginal cost
to learn knowledge on a certain interval increases with the distances between the interval and the agents’
born types.
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The symmetric Bayesian equilibrium results in multiple solutions in many cases
of the acculturation game. We focus on payoff dominant equilibrium, which has a
unique solution for the game. The general statement and full characterization of the
payoff dominant equilibrium is given by Proposition 2.5 at Section 2.4.4. We will walk
readers through: from the examples and characterizations of three cases with mci (·),
mcd (·) and mcu (·) to the characterization of general cases.
The definition of payoff dominate equilibrium is as follows:
Definition 2.1. A strategy s∗ comprises a payoff dominant equilibrium, if s∗ is Pareto
superior to all other symmetric equilibria. That is, s∗ is a payoff dominant equilibrium,
if the following conditions hold:
(i) s∗ ∈ S in which S =
{
s ∈ A (Θ)Θ | ∀i, s (θi) = arg maxsi∈A(θi) u (si, θi, s, f)
}
;
(ii) ∀s ∈ S\{s∗} and ∀θi, u (θi, s∗, f) ≥ u (θi, s, f), and ∃θi such that u (θi, s∗, f) >
u (θi, s, f).
Set S contains all symmetric equilibria. Every agent’s expected utilities in equilib-
rium s∗ are at least as much as hers/his in the other symmetric equilibria, and at least
one agent is strictly better off in equilibrium s∗.
The reasons why we should expect the payoff dominant equilibrium in the accul-
turation game is as follows. As we mentioned in the literature review, immigrants, as
the agents with low levels of cultural knowledge, are more risk-loving than the native
born residents and have high willingness to improve their living condition. Therefore,
they would prefer to enforce the payoff dominant equilibrium.
The following Example 2.1 shows the multiplicities of symmetric equilibria and
the uniqueness of payoff dominant equilibrium of the acculturation game with a strictly
increasing marginal cost function.
Example 2.1 Consider the game with uniform distribution f(θ) = 1 and strictly in-
creasing marginal cost function mci (θ) = 2θ such that C (si, θi) = s2i − θ2i . In sym-
metric equilibria:
s (θ) =
θ 0 ≤ θ < θθ θ ≤ θ ≤ 1 , (2.3)
2.3. The Model 59
in which θ can be any real number in [1/3, 1/2]. The left graph of Figure 2.2 shows the
equilibrium strategy with θ = 1/3, 2/5, and 1/2 respectively, such that agents born in[
0, θ
]
expand to θ, and agents born in
[
θ, 1
]
stay with their born types.
The symmetric equilibrium s in eq. (2.3) with θ = 1/3 is derived from the assum-
ing that no agents will expand in equilibrium s (θ) = θ. The agent with born type 0
has incentives to expand to 1/3 with utility function si− 3s2i /2 given s (θ) = θ. Agent
0’s expansion to level 1/3 increases the marginal utilities of agents with born types in
[0, 1/3] to expand to level 1/3. Therefore, we have the equilibrium s with θ = 1/3.
The symmetric equilibrium s in eq. (2.3) with θ = 1/2 is derived from the assump-
tion that every agent chooses as least as high as any other agent in the society. Agent
with born type 0 expands to 1/2 with utility function si− s2i under the assumption. So
does any other agent in the society. As 1/2 is not in the action sets of agents with born
types higher than 1/2, we have the symmetric equilibrium s with θ = 1/2.
Therefore, it is not hard to get that s with any θ ∈ [1/3, 1/2] is a symmetric equi-
librium: any equilibrium with a θ ∈ (1/3, 1/2) leads to that for all i, her/his marginal
utilities are strictly larger than 0 on
[
θi, θ
]
, and are strictly less than 0 on
[
θ, 1
]
.
Figure 2.2 Equilibrium strategy eq. (2.3) and auxiliary utility functions eq. (2.4).
The payoff dominant equilibrium of Example 2.1 is s∗ with θ
∗
= 1/2. Given a
equilibrium strategy s (·) in eq. (2.3), the shape of utility function, which shows the
relationship between each agents’ utilities and the strategy she/he chooses, is the same
for any two agents on the action set they have in common. Therefore, for any agent
2.4. Shapes of Equilibria 60
i, we only need to analyze the universal auxiliary utility function u (·, θi, s, f) − θ2i
but on i’s action set [θi, 1] to find the utility maximization point. The auxiliary utility
function is present as:
u (si, θi, s, f)− θ2i =
 si − s
2
i
θ
2
/2 + si − 3s2i /2
θi ≤ si < θ
max
{
θi, θ
} ≤ si ≤ 1 . (2.4)
The graph on the right of Figure 2.2 shows u− θ2i with θ = 1/3, 2/5, and 1/2.
Every agent’s utilities increase with θ. Therefore, we have the payoff dominant
equilibrium s∗ with θ = 1/2.
2.4 Shapes of Equilibria
Before we analyze the equilibrium strategy for marginal cost function mci (·), mcd (·)
andmcu (·) in Section 2.4.1, Section 2.4.2 and Section 2.4.3, and show the full charac-
terization of payoff dominant equilibrium with general costs in Section 2.4.4, we show
some general properties of the payoff dominant equilibrium strategy.
The payoff dominant equilibrium strategy in Example 2.1 is non-decreasing and
displays the conformity of expansion level for agents at certain intervals. Proposi-
tion 2.1 shows that the two features hold in general.
Proposition 2.1. In the acculturation game, payoff dominant equilibrium s∗ (·) is a
nondecreasing function; and if there exist θi, ai such that 0 ≤ θi < ai ≤ 1 and
s∗ (θi) = ai, then for all θ ∈ [θi, ai], s∗ (θ) = ai.
If an agent θi expands to ai in payoff dominant equilibrium, then the agents with
born types in [θi, ai] expand to ai. The proof is as follows.
Proof. We prove the conformity of users’ behavior firstly, which is the second part of
proposition. Given a strategy s∗ (·) played by other agents, the marginal utilities from
the term
∫ 1
0
min (si, s
∗ (θ)) dF (θ) is the same for agent i and agent j. Combined with
that the marginal cost is also the same for them, the marginal utilities are the same
for any two agents θi < θj of expanding to any level a ∈ (θj, 1]. Then, agent θi and
agent θj reach their local utility maximization points at interval (θj, 1] at the same time.
Therefore, if agent θi expands to a level ai > θj in equilibrium, then agent θj chooses
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the same expansion level by the definition of payoff dominant equilibrium. Suppose
agent θi gains the same amount of utilities from two different utility maximization
points a and a′ at [θj, 1] such that a < a′. Then, both agent θi and θj choose a′ in
payoff dominant equilibria. This is due to that ui is a continuous and nondecreasing
function of s−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}A (θj) and the utility function of agent with born type 1
is strictly increasing with s−i; and that si is also a non-decreasing function of s−i.
Considering that θj could be any real number at interval [θi, ai].
For the nondecreasing of equilibrium strategy: it is possible that agent θi expands
to a level lower than or equal to θj , or stay with born type θi, if the total cost of
expanding to a > θj is too high to be covered by the increment of interacting utilities.
Therefore, we have Proposition 2.1. Q.E.D.
2.4.1 Strictly Increasing Marginal Cost Functions
Consider the game with a strictly increasing marginal cost function mci (·). In payoff
dominant equilibrium, the agents born with low levels of cultural knowledge expand
while the agents with high levels do not.
As shown in Example 2.1, the payoff dominant equilibrium with mci (·) is derived
with the assumption that every agent at least chooses an action as high as any user.
Therefore, if there exists an a ∈ [0, 1] such that mci (a) = 1 and we have mci (·)’s
inverse function mci−1 : [mci (0) , 1]→ [0, 1], then agent θi ∈
[
0,mci
−1 (1)
]
expands
to mci−1 (1), while agent θi ∈
(
mci
−1 (1) , 1
]
stays with her/his born type. Combine
with two other cases :(i) if mci (1) ≤ 1, all agents expand to 1; or (ii) if mci (0) > 1,
all agents stays with their born types. We have:
Proposition 2.2. If the marginal cost function is strictly increasing denoted asmci (·),
then in payoff dominant equilibrium:
(i) if ∃a ∈ (0, 1] such that mci (a) = 1, then
s∗ (θ) =
 mc
i−1 (1)
θ
0 ≤ θ < mci−1 (1)
mci
−1 (1) ≤ θ ≤ 1
;
(ii) if mci (1) ≤ 1, for all θ, s∗ (θ) = 1;
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(iii) if mci (0) > 1, for all θ, s∗ (θ) = θ.
For the details of proof, please see Section 2.7.1.
Agents acquire more but not all cultural knowledge, if the marginal cost of gaining
new cultural knowledge at some level is higher than their marginal utilities of interact-
ing. The expansion level mci−1 (1) is independent of the distribution function F (·).
The first case with strictly increasing marginal cost functions applies to the social-
ization of children. They do not have any primitive cultural knowledge or any estab-
lished cultural identity. Children interact with people to acquire their first languages
and form social manners.
2.4.2 Strictly Decreasing Marginal Cost Functions
This section starts with Example 2.2, which shows the shape of equilibrium strategy
with a strictly decreasing marginal cost function. Then, we analyze the equilibrium
strategy with general mcd (·).
Example 2.2 If the game is with density distribution function f (θ) = 2θ and marginal
cost function mcd (θ) = 3− 3θ, then in payoff dominant equilibrium:
s∗ (θi) =
 θ1
0 ≤ θ < 1/2
1/2 ≤ θ ≤ 1
. (2.5)
The equilibrium strategy is present at the left graph of Figure 2.3. The agents with low
levels of cultural knowledge stay with their born types in equilibrium. The intuition
is that the cost is too high to be covered by the increment of interacting utilities from
expansion.
Consider the game with a strictly decreasing marginal cost function mcd (·). We
use Θ (s∗ (·)) = {θi ∈ [0, 1] | s∗ (θi) > θi and s∗ (θi) > maxθ<θi s∗ (θ)} to denote the
set of agents, each of whom is the one with the smallest born type expands to a certain
level. If Θ = ∅, no agent expands in equilibrium; and if Θ 6= ∅, there are some agents
expanding in equilibrium.
In the game with a mcd (·), agents either stay with their born types or expand to
level 1 in equilibria, such that |Θ| ≤ 1. If Θ 6= ∅, we use θ to denote the unique
element in Θ, in which θ = min
{
x ∈ [0, 1) | (1− x) [1− F (x)] = ∫ 1
x
mcd (θ) dθ
}
.
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Figure 2.3 Equilibria of Example 2.2 and Example 2.3.
The smallest real number θ solves equation (1− θ) [1− F (θ)] = ∫ 1
θ
mcd (θ) dθ.12 It
means that: different from the agents with born types in [0, θ) who choose to stay with
their born types, agent θ switches to expand to level 1, since her/his total interacting
utility increment of expanding to level 1 is equal to the total cost of that. Therefore:
Proposition 2.3. If the marginal cost function is strictly decreasing denoted asmcd (·),
in payoff dominant equilibria:
(i) if Θ = ∅, then for all θ, s∗ (θ) = θ;
(ii) if Θ 6= ∅, then
s∗ (θ) =
 θ1
0 ≤ θ < θ
θ ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
Please see Section 2.7.1 for the details of the proof.
Agents with low levels of cultural knowledge stay with their born types, as the cost
of expanding to level 1 is too high to be covered by the interacting utilities’ increments
from expansion.
12The equation could have other solutions, which are not the thresholds of payoff dominant equilib-
rium, and some of which are not the thresholds of symmetric equilibrium.
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The acculturation game with strictly decreasing marginal cost functions applies to
the acculturation of second-generation immigrant adolescents. Our results in equilibria
explain the marginalization and separation of individuals from some minority groups
in their acculturation process.
2.4.3 U-shaped Marginal Cost Functions
We start with Example 2.3, which shows the shape of equilibrium strategy with a U-
shaped marginal cost function. General cases with U-shaped function are solved below
the example.
Example 2.3 Considermcu (θ) = 3.25θ2−3.5θ+1.75 and f (ρ) = 2θ. In payoff dom-
inant equilibrium, there are two thresholds θ and θ such that θ = 7/29+2
√
1222/377 ≈
0.056 and θ = 7/13 + 2
√
2.5− 13θ2/13 ≈ 0.78, then:
s∗ (θ) =

θ
θ
θ
θ < θ
θ < θ < θ
θ ≥ θ
.
The equilibrium strategy is present at the right graph of Figure 2.3. The effects from
U-shaped marginal cost result in that both agents with low and high born types do not
expand, while the agents with middle born types expand.
In the equilibrium of the game with a U-shaped marginal cost function, there are
two “thresholds” θ, θ ∈ [0, 1] such that θ ≤ θ; the agents with born types lower than
θ or higher than θ stay with their born types, while the agents with born types in
between θ and θ expand to θ. In the following paragraphs, we further characterize the
equilibrium strategy with U-shaped marginal cost functions.
Consider the game with a U-shaped marginal cost function.
We reorganize the utility eq. (2.2) as follows:
u (s∗i , s, θi) =
the least motivation to expand︷ ︸︸ ︷
s∗i [1− F (θi)] +
∫ θi
0
s∗ (θ) dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utilities of interacting
−C (s∗i , θi) . (2.6)
Non-decreasing of equilibrium strategy in Proposition 2.1 implies that no matter what
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agent θi chooses in equilibrium, all agents with born types higher than θi choose the
same or higher levels. Therefore, 1− F (θi), the proportion of agents with born types
higher than θi, is the least marginal interacting utilities of expanding for agent θi in
payoff dominant equilibrium.13 The second term
∫ θi
0
s∗ (θ) dF (θ) has impacts on θi’s
expansion level in equilibrium, if there is an agent with born type less than θi expand-
ing to a level higher than θi.
We define its inverse function as such: if mcu (θ∗) ≤ 1, the inverse function of
mcu (·) is defined as mcu−1 (·) : [mcu (θ∗) , 1] → [θ∗, 1], in which if mcu (1) < 1, for
all θ ∈ [mcu (1) , 1], mcu−1 (θ) = 1. If θi ∈ Θ, then s∗ (θi) = mcu−1 (1− F (θi)),
where agent θi ’s marginal utilities equal to 0.
If the marginal cost function is mcu (·), there exists at most one element in Θ. If
Θ 6= ∅, let x = mcu−1 (1− F (x)), then we have
θ = min
{
x ∈ [0, 1) | (x− x) [1− F (x)] =
∫ x
x
mcu (θ) dθ
}
,
such that θ is the unique element of Θ and θ = mcu−1 (1− F (θ)). The smallest real
number θ in [0, 1] solves equation
(
θ − θ) (1− F (θ)) = ∫ θ
θ
mcu (θ) dθ, which means
that agent θ chooses to expand to θ since her/his utility increments of expanding to θ
equal to her/his total cost of that.14 The agents with born types lower than θ and those
with born types higher than θ do not expand, due to no positive gains from expanding.
Therefore:
Proposition 2.4. If the marginal cost function is U-shaped denoted as mcu (·), in
payoff dominant equilibrium:
(i) if Θ 6= ∅, then
s∗ (θ) =

θ
θ
θ
θ < θ
θ < θ < θ
θ ≥ θ
;
(ii) if Θ = ∅, for all θ, s∗ (θ) = θ.
13Note that 1 − F (θi) is not the least marginal interacting utilities of expanding for agent θi in
symmetric equilibria.
14The equation could have other solutions, which are not the thresholds of payoff dominant equilib-
rium, and some of which are not the thresholds of symmetric equilibrium.
2.4. Shapes of Equilibria 66
Please see Section 2.7.1 for details of the proof.
The game with U-shaped marginal cost functions applies to the acculturation of
first-generation immigrants. They interact with individuals who have different estab-
lished cultural identities at working environment. First-generation immigrants experi-
ence both acculturative stress and difficulties in order to acquire cultural knowledge of
the mainstream.
2.4.4 General Costs
For any mc (·), agent i compares her/his utilities at local utility maximization levels
and the boundary points {θi, 1}. We use set A∗ (θi) to collect all the possible choices
of i, such that:
A∗ (θi) := {a ∈ [θi, 1] | mc (a) = 1− F (θi) or a ∈ {θi, 1}} .
We use function ∆u (θi) to represent the largest non-negative utility difference of i
between choosing from A∗ (θi) and staying with her/his born type. Then:
∆u (θi) := max
a∈A∗(θi)
u (a, s, θi)−u (θi, s, θi) = max
a∈A∗(θi)
[1− F (θi)] (a− θi)−C (a, θi) .
Furthermore, we define a function smax (θi) = max arg ∆u (θi) to pick the maximal
level among all utility maximization levels of agent θi.
Combined with the cases where there exists an agent with born type smaller than
θi choose a level higher than θi, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5. There exists a unique payoff dominant equilibrium and the equilib-
rium strategy is s∗ (θi) = maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ) for all θi in [0, 1].
For the proof of the uniqueness, please see Section 2.7.1.
An equilibrium strategy is a piecewise function. The function has several jump-
ing points. Between the jumping points, the function firstly stays constant and then
increases; the increasing parts of the function overlap with the 45◦ line through the
origin point 0. With Θ denoted as
{
θ1, ..., θ|Θ|
}
such that θ1 < ... < θ|Θ|, the equilib-
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rium strategy is represented as
s∗ (θ) =

θ
s (θ1)
...
s
(
θ|Θ|
)
θ
0 ≤ θ < θ1
θ1 ≤ θ < s (θ1)
...
θ|Θ| ≤ θ < s
(
θ|Θ|
)
s
(
θ|Θ|
) ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
2.5 Policy and Social Welfare
Consider an integration policy which sets a minimum level on the cultural knowledge
spectrum for all agents to achieve. The action sets of agents whose born types are
smaller than the policy level are constrained. In this section, we define payoff dominant
equilibrium with policy constraints; then we analyze the equilibrium strategy and the
optimal policy for the three cases. The characterizations of equilibrium strategy are
present in lemmas, and the results of optimal policy are present in propositions and/or
with diagrams.
2.5.1 Policy setting and General solutions
We use τ ∈ [0, 1] to denote the minimum level knowledge for all agents to achieve.
Agents’ possible choice sets are constrained to be equal to or more than τ such that
A (θ, τ) := {ai | max {τ, θ} ≤ ai ≤ 1}.
Definition 2.2. A strategy s∗ (., τ) comprises a τ -payoff dominant equilibrium, if for a
policy level τ , strategy s∗ (θi, τ) is Pareto superior to all other symmetric equilibrium
with A (, τ). That is, s∗ (., τ) is a τ -payoff dominant equilibrium for a policy level τ ,
if for every θi displayed by any typical agent i, the following conditions hold:
(i) s∗ (, τ) ∈ S (, τ) such that:
S (., τ) =
{
s (., τ) ∈ A (Θ, τ)Θ | ∀θi, s (θi, τ) = arg max
si∈A(θi,τ)
u (si, θi, s (., τ) , f)
}
;
(ii) ∀s (., τ) ∈ S (., τ) \ {s∗ (, τ)} and ∀θi, u (θi, s∗ (., τ) , f) ≥ u (θi, s (., τ) , f),
and ∃θ such that u (θ, s∗ (., τ) , f) > u (θ, s (., τ) , f).
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Set S (., τ) contains all symmetric equilibria constrained by τ . Every agent’s ex-
pected utilities in equilibrium s∗ (., τ) are at least as much as hers/his in the other
symmetric equilibria with constraint τ ; and at least one agent is strictly better off in
equilibrium s∗ (., τ).
The agents endowed with smaller than τ knowledge levels compare choices from
the constrained possible choice sets and the minimum knowledge level τ , such that:
A∗ (θ, τ) := {a ∈ [max {τ, θ} , 1] | mc (a) = 1− F (θ) or a ∈ {τ, θ, 1}} .
only the agents whose born types are larger than τ compare the choices from possible
choice sets. Therefore, function ∆u (θ, τ) is defined as follows:
∆u (θ, τ) =
 maxa∈A
∗(θ,τ) [1− F (θ)] (a− τ)− C (a, τ)
∆u (θ)
θ < τ
θ ≥ τ
.
Thus, we define a function smax (θ, τ) = max arg ∆u (θ, τ) to pick the largest
choice for each agent from her/his utility maximization points.
Proposition 2.6. Given a τ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a unique political payoff dominant
equilibrium; and the equilibrium strategy is s∗ (θi, τ) = maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ, τ).
The proof follows that of Proposition 2.5.
Consider there is a social planner of the society, who impose a policy level on all
individuals before they choose their cultural knowledge expansion levels. The social
welfare isW (τ, f) =
∫ 1
0
u (s∗ (θ, τ) , θ, f) f (θ) dθ. The social planner aims to choose
an optimal policy level τ ∗ to maximize the social welfare such that:
τ ∗ = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
W (τ, f) .
We consider population density distribution f (θ) = 2ρθ + 1 − ρ such that ∀ρ ∈
[0, 1], F (1) =
∫ 1
0
(2ρθ + 1− ρ) dθ ≡ 1. If ρ = 0, f (θ) follows a uniform distribution;
if ρ = 1, f (θ) = 2θ. The higher ρ is, the steeper the density distribution is.
In the following three sections, we show political payoff dominant equilibria and
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optimal policy levels of three cases of the game with strictly increasing, strict decreas-
ing and U-shaped marginal cost functions.
2.5.2 Strictly Increasing Marginal Cost Functions
In this section, we show agents’ equilibrium strategy in Lemma 2.1 with any mci (·).
For the optimal policy, we study the game with a well-defined linearly increasing
marginal cost function. The results in Proposition 2.7 show that the policy improves
social welfare in all cases with imposing a higher expansion level than θ in equilibrium
without policy.
Ifmci (·) and τ ≤ θ, the strategy in political payoff dominant equilibria is the same
as that in payoff dominant equilibria; if τ > θ, the agents with born types lower than
τ choose the policy level τ , while other agents stay with their born types. Therefore,
Lemma 2.1. If the marginal cost function is mci (·), in political payoff dominant equi-
librium:
(i) if τ ≤ θ, s∗ (θ, τ) = s∗ (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) if τ > θ,
s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
θ ≤ τ
θ > τ
.
We now further specify mci (θ) = 2λ1θ such that λ1 ≥ 1/2.15 The higher λ1 is,
the higher the difficulties in learning is.
Proposition 2.7. For all ρ ∈ [0, 1], λ1 ∈ (1/2,+∞), there exists a unique optimal
policy variable τ ∗ ∈ (θ, 1] such that
τ ∗ =

2
1+2λ1
1
2ρ
(√
(ρ− 2λ1 − 1)2 + 8ρ− 2λ1 + ρ− 1
)
√
λ21 + 2− λ1
ρ = 0
0 < ρ < 1
ρ = 1
in which ∂τ ∗/∂λ1 < 0 and ∂τ ∗/∂ρ > 0.
15If λ1 ≤ 1/2, s∗ (θ) = 1 for all θ, then no matter what τ is, it has no effect on the equilibria and
social welfare.
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Figure 2.4 τ ∗ for ρ = 0, 0.5, 1 with mci (θ) = 2λ1θ.
Figure 2.4 shows optimal level τ ∗ with ρ = 0, 0.5 and 1 respectively. As the
difficulty level in learning λ1 increases, τ ∗ decreases in all cases; τ ∗ increases with ρ,
given a λ1 holds.
The optimal levels are higher than the values of θ = mci−1 (1) in all cases.
2.5.3 Decreasing Marginal Cost Functions
We study a well-defined linearly decreasing marginal cost function. Agents’ equilib-
rium strategy are summarized at Lemma 2.3. For the optimal policy in Proposition 2.8
and Section 2.5.3, fully adapting policy improves social welfare in most cases; how-
ever, if the level of acculturative stress is too high, no policy should be imposed.
In political payoff dominant equilibrium with strictly decreasing marginal cost
functions, either (i) all agents choose to learn all cultural knowledge; or (ii) agents
whose born types are at [0, τ ] choose τ and the other agents choose the same as they
do in payoff dominant equilibrium.
We further assume the marginal cost function is: mcd (θ) = 2λ2 − 2λ2θ. The
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higher λ2 is, the higher the level of acculturative stress is.
We need to study the equilibria without policy for further understanding of equi-
libria with policy. When λ2−ρ < 1, some agents expand; when λ2−ρ ≥ 1, no agents
expand.
Lemma 2.2. If marginal cost function mcd (θ) = 2λ2 − 2λ2θ, in payoff dominant
equilibrium :
(i) if λ2 − ρ < 1, s∗ (θ) =
 θ1
0 ≤ θ < θ
θ ≤ θ ≤ 1
in which
θ = − 1
2ρ
√
(ρ+ λ2 − 1)2 + 4ρ (ρ+ λ2 − 1) + λ2
2ρ
+
1
2
− 1
2ρ
;
(ii) if λ2 − ρ ≥ 1, for all ρ, there is no adaptation in payoff dominant equilibrium.
Consider the equilibria with policy. If τ < 1− 1/λ2, agents with born types lower
than τ expand to τ , while agents with other born types expand to the same level as they
do in equilibria without policy; if τ ≥ 1−1/λ2, then all agents expand to 1. Combined
with the two different cases shown at Lemma 2.2, we have political payoff dominant
equilibria as follows:
Lemma 2.3. If the marginal cost function is mcd (θ) = 2λ2 − 2λ2θ, then:
(i) if λ2 − ρ < 1, in political payoff dominant equilibrium:
(a) if τ < 1− 1/λ2, s∗ (θ, τ) =

τ
θ
1
θ ≤ τ
τ < θ ≤ θ
θ < θ ≤ 1
;
(b) if 1− 1/λ2 ≤ τ ≤ 1, s∗ (θ, τ) = 1.
(ii) if λ2 − ρ > 1, Θ = ∅; and in political payoff dominant equilibrium:
(a) if τ < 1− 1/λ2, s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
θ ≤ τ
τ < θ ≤ 1
;
(b) if 1− 1/λ2 ≤ τ ≤ 1, s∗ (θ, τ) = 1;
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That θ > 1− 1/λ2 is checked in the proof of Lemma 2.3 at Section 2.7.1.
The results imply that with policy level 1−1/λ2 which is less than 1, all the agents
fully adapt to the society.
We have the following proposition characterize τ ∗:
Proposition 2.8. For all ρ ∈ [0, 1], if λ2−ρ ≤ 1, τ ∗ is any level at interval [1− 1/λ2, 1];
if λ2 − ρ > +1:
(i) if λ2 ≤ (20 + 5ρ+ ρ2) / (10− 5ρ), τ ∗ is any level in [1− 1/λ2, 1];
(ii) if λ2 > (20 + 5ρ+ ρ2) / (10− 5ρ), τ ∗ = 0.
For the details of calculation, please see Section 2.7.1.
Figure 2.5 Phase Diagram with mcd (θ) = 2λ2 − 2λ2θ.
Section 2.5.3 summarizes Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.8 by showing equilibrium
without policy and optimal policies as λ2 and ρ range. In the grey area, some agents
acquire all cultural knowledge in equilibrium without policy. In the red area, the opti-
mal policy level τ ∗ is at level 1. The grey area is a sub area of the red area. Therefore,
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if there exist some agents expanding their knowledge spectrum without policy, the
optimal policy τ ∗ = 1 should be used.
2.5.4 U-shaped Marginal Cost Functions
Figure 2.6 Phase Diagram with U-shape Marginal Cost eq. (2.7).
Consider a U-shaped marginal cost function defined as
mcu (θ) = λ1θ
2 + λ2 (1− θ)2 , (2.7)
such that 1 < λ1, λ2 ≤ 4; λ1 denotes the difficulty levels, and λ2 denotes the stress
levels in learning. The results of optimal policy levels are present in Figure 2.6 and
Figure 2.7; and please see the explanation of the two Figures in the next two para-
graph.16
The social welfare maximization problem can not be solved analytically. We show
the solutions of optimal policies in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7. Figure 2.6 presents
16For the political payoff dominant equilibrium, it has four types of strategies depending the values
of λ1 and λ2, the existence of Θ, and the value of θ if Θ is not empty. Please see Section 2.7.2 for
further analysis of equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 2.7 Phase Diagram with U-shape Marginal Cost eq. (2.7).
five areas and each area presents a type of policy changing with ρ. Figure 2.7 shows
a typical optimal policy for each area as ρ increases. Colors of the thick lines in
Figure 2.7 correspond to the colors of areas in Figure 2.6. For the grey, green and
yellow areas, a policy level should be set whatever ρ is. In the yellow area, θ = 0 such
that agents with born type 0 expand without policy; in the green area, θ > 0 or Θ = ∅;
in the grey area, minmcu (θ) > 1 such that Θ = ∅ and no agent expands without
policy. In the blue area, the policy level should be set if ρ is above some threshold. In
the red area, no policy should be set whatever ρ is. Both blue and red area have no
expanding agents without policy. The blue thin lines in Figure 2.7 are θt and the red
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line is mcu−1 (1).17
We can see from Figure 2.6 that at a given λ1 there exist at least two phases as λ2
increases and at most five phases as λ2 increases; at a given λ2 there exists at least one
phase as λ2 increases and at most four phases as λ1 increases. In general, the effec-
tiveness of the policy is impeded more by λ2, the indicator of levels of acculturative
stress, than λ1, the indicator of difficulties in learning.
2.6 Conclusion
We use a game-theoretical approach to describe agents’ cultural knowledge learning
behavior in acculturation and regard cultural tests as a type of policy improving social
welfare by setting minimum levels of cultural knowledge of the mainstream for all
agents. We model the culture knowledge on the interval [0, 1]. Agents are endowed
with certain levels of cultural knowledge, and they acquire the cultural knowledge
to coordinate with other agents. We show the uniqueness and full characterization
of payoff dominant equilibria and those of political payoff dominant equilibria. In
particular, we study equilibria and optimal policies of three cases of the game with
different types of marginal cost functions.
The first case of acculturation game considers strictly increasing marginal cost
functions. It applies to the socialization of children. Children acquire their first lan-
guages through interaction without pressure but with difficulties in learning. In equilib-
ria, agents acquire more but not all cultural knowledge if the marginal cost of gaining
new cultural knowledge is higher than the marginal utilities of interacting.
The second case of the game considers strictly decreasing marginal cost functions.
It applies to the acculturation of second-generation immigrant adolescents. Their cul-
tural parts of upbringing are different from the dominant culture. They experience
acculturative stress from interacting with their classmates and playmates with the dom-
inant cultural background. In equilibria, the agents endowed with low levels of knowl-
edge are marginalized, in the sense that they do not gain any more cultural knowledge
to improve their abilities to coordinate. In empirical studies, segmented assimilations
are observed. However, our model can not capture factors, such as the sizes of minority
17θt is the transition point of τ for all agents expanding to mcu
−1 (1). For more detail, please see
Section 2.7.2.
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groups which have an impact on the outcomes of acculturation at this stage.
The third case of acculturation game with U-shape marginal cost functions ap-
plies to the acculturation of first-generation immigrants. They experience acculturative
stress and difficulties in learning. In equilibria, the agents endowed with middle levels
of cultural knowledge choose to acquire cultural knowledge but not all, and the agents
endowed with low and high levels of cultural knowledge do not acquire any cultural
knowledge. The studies of labor economics on immigrants’ earnings assimilation ob-
serve that immigrants’ earnings surpass the earnings of native-born individuals. They
suggest that there are self-selective effects of immigrants: immigrants have higher
willingness to improve their living conditions and are more risk-loving than native-
born individuals. Our model cannot capture the heterogeneity of immigrants at this
stage.
We have closed-form solutions of optimal policies for the first and second cases
with well-defined linear functions. Optimal policies of the first case set minimum
policy levels higher than the adaptation levels without policy; however, the optimal
policy level decreases with the difficulties in learning. In the second case where some
agents acquire all cultural knowledge without policy, optimal policies are less than one
but induce all agents to acquire all cultural knowledge; however, if the stress level is
too high, no policy should be implemented. For U-shaped marginal cost functions, we
study quadratic marginal cost functions. In general, the effectiveness of minimum level
policy is impeded more by high levels of acculturative stress than by high difficulties
in learning.
The game-theoretical analysis of inter-cultural social coordination is still at an
early stage. Our model can be extended in many ways including taking into account
of the heterogeneity of agents, analyzing the dynamics of adapting etc. We also expect
to test our model with data and estimate cost functions.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2. Consider the case where there exists an a ∈ [0, 1] such
that mci (a) = 1. For agent with born type 0, u (si, 0, s, f) = si − c (si) by the non-
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decreasing of strategy in payoff dominant equilibrium. The maximum of u (si, 0, s, f)
is at si = mci
−1 (1) by the first order condition. By Proposition 2.1, we have that agent
θi ∈
[
0,mci
−1 (1)
]
reaches her/his utility maximization point at mci−1 (1), while the
utility maximization point of agent θi ∈
(
mci
−1 (1) , 1
]
is her/his born type. It is the
payoff dominant equilibrium, since si−c (si) is also the upper bound of utility function
given any strategy.
Consider the case wheremci (1) ≤ 1. For the agent with born type 0, her/his utility
function u (si, 0, s, f) = si − c (si) is strictly increasing on interval [0, 1]. Therefore,
agent 0 expands to 1, and so do other agents.
Consider the case wheremci (0) > 1. For the agent with born type 0, her/his utility
function u (si, 0, s, f) = si − c (si) is strictly decreasing on interval [0, 1]. Therefore,
agent 0 do not expand, and other agents do not, neither. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3. In a game with mcd (·), agent θi either (i) expands to
1 if u (1, s∗, θi) ≥ u (θi, s∗, θi), or (ii) stays with their born types if u (1, s∗, θi) <
u (θi, s
∗, θi). To prove the statement above, consider agent θi = 0, the marginal utility
increases since the marginal utilities of interacting from expansion is 1 in all payoff
dominant equilibria. Therefore, the utility maximization point is either 0 or 1. Now,
suppose there exists an agent θj ∈ [0, 1) such that s∗ (θj) = aj and aj ∈ (θj, 1). Then,
the marginal utilities at aj for agent θj is 0 and marginal utilities is negative at [aj, 1].
So are for agents with born types smaller than θj , which includes agent θi = 0. It
contradicts the strictly increasing of agent θi’s marginal utilities.
Then, |Θ| ≤ 1 in the game with strictly decreasing functions, since agents’ choices
are limited to 1 or their born types; if an agent expands to 1, the agents with born types
higher than her/him expand to 1 by Proposition 2.1.
For θ, it solves equation (1− θ) [1− F (θ)] = ∫ 1
θ
mcd (θ) dθ in the payoff domi-
nant equilibrium, since it considers the largest set of agents expand. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4. We prove the uniqueness of Θ by contradiction. Sup-
pose that there are two agents θi and θj such that θi,j ∈ Θ and θi < θj; θi expands to
s∗ (θi) > θi and θj expands to s∗ (θj) > θj . By the least motivation to expand, we have
1 − F (θi,j) − mcu (s∗ (θi,j)) = 0 at [θi, 1]. As mcu−1 (1− F (θ)) is non-decreasing
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with respect to θ, we have:
s∗ (θi) = mcu
−1 (1− F (θi)) > mcu−1 (1− F (θj)) = s∗ (θj) .
It contradicts Proposition 2.1.
For θ and θ, if Θ 6= ∅, let x = mcu−1 (1− F (x)), then:
θ = min
{
x ∈ [0, 1) | (x− x) [1− F (x)] =
∫ x
x
mcu (θ) dθ
}
.
The equation above considers the largest set of agents who expand.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.5. Each agent’s minimum choice is assigned by smax (·)
in payoff dominant equilibrium. Therefore, maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ) assigns the minimum
choice to each agent in payoff dominant equilibrium.
Function maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ) also assigns the maximal choices to each agent, since
smax (0) is the also maximal choice agent 0 plays in payoff dominant equilibrium and
maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ) preserves all the maximal choices of all agents with born types
larger than 0. Since smax (0) is maximal choice agent 0 plays in payoff dominant
equilibrium, then for agent θ < smax (0), s∗ (θ) = s∗ (0) which assigns maximal
choices to the agents; For agent θ > smax (0), check if smax (θ) > θ: (i) if it is the
case, then agent θ′ ∈ [θ, smax (θ)] such that s∗ (θ′) = smax (θ) which assigns maximal
choices to the agents; then the same for θ′′ > smax (θ)...; (ii) if it is not, then s∗ (θ) = θ
which still assign maximal choices to the agents. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.7. Given mci (θ) = 2λ1θ and λ1 ≥ 1/2, the social wel-
fare function for τ > θ = 1/ (2λ1):
W (τ ; ρ) =
[
1
3
+
1
6
ρ+
1
30
ρ2 + τ 2 (1− ρ) + τ 3
(
−1
3
+
4
3
ρ− 1
3
ρ2
)]
+
[
τ 4
(
−1
2
ρ+
1
2
ρ2
)
− 1
5
ρ2τ 5
]
− λ1
[
1
2
ρτ 4 +
2
3
(1− ρ) τ 3
]
.
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The first order condition with respect to τ is:
2τ (1− ρ)− τ 2 (1 + 2λ1 − 4ρ− 2λ1ρ+ ρ2)+ τ 3 (−2λ1ρ− 2ρ+ 2ρ2)− τ 4ρ2 = 0.
(2.8)
When ρ = 0, eq. (2.8) results in:
τρ=0 =
 02/ (1 + 2λ1) .
At [0, 2/ (1 + 2λ1)), ∂W/∂τ > 0, and at (2/ (1 + 2λ1) , 1], ∂W/∂τ < 0. Therefore,
the optimal policy level is τ ∗ρ=0 = 2/ (1 + 2λ1).
When ρ = 1, eq. (2.8) results in:
τ 1ρ=1 =

0
τ 2ρ=1 =
√
λ21 + 2− λ1
τ 3ρ=1 = −
√
λ21 + 2− λ1
.
We have ∂W/∂τ > 0 at interval
[
0, τ 2ρ=1
)
; and ∂W/∂τ < 0 at interval
(
τ 2ρ=1, 1
]
.
Therefore, the optimal policy level is τ ∗ρ=1 =
√
λ21 + 2− λ1.
When ρ ∈ (0, 1), eq. (2.8) results in:
τρ =

(ρ− 1) /ρ
−
√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ/ (2ρ) + 1/2− λ1/ρ− 1/ (2ρ)(√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ+ ρ− 2λ1 − 1
)
/ (2ρ)
0
.
We have ∂W/∂τ > 0 at interval
[
0, τ 3ρ
)
; and ∂W/∂τ < 0 at interval
(
τ 3ρ , 1
]
. The
optimal policy is:
τ ∗ρ =
1
2ρ
(
−
√
(ρ− 2λ1 − 1)2 + 8ρ− 2λ1 + ρ− 1
)
.
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By the continuity of function W , for all τ ∗,
∂τ ∗
∂ρ
= 2λ1 + 1− 4λ
2
1 + 4λ1 + 1 + 3ρ− 2ρλ1√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ
.
We prove the ratio of the third term to the sum of the first and second term is smaller
than 1:
2λ1 + 1− ρ+ 2ρλ12λ1+1√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ
< 1.
By 2λ1/ (2λ1 + 1) < 1 < 8. Therefore, ∂τ ∗/∂ρ > 0.
Now consider the derivatives of λ1:
∂τ ∗
∂λ1
= −1
ρ
1− 2λ1 + 1− ρ√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ
 ;
we have ∂τ ∗/∂λ1 < 0 by (2λ1 + 1− ρ) /(
√
(−ρ+ 2λ1 + 1)2 + 8ρ < 1. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.2. If maxθ ∆u (ρ, λ2, θ) > 0, there exists a θ; Otherwise, there
is no expansion behavior:
∆u (ρ, λ2, θ) = (θ − 1)
(
ρθ2 + (1− ρ− λ2) θ + λ2 − 1
)
.
F.O.C. of ∆u (ρ, λ2, θ), we have:
3ρθ2 + 2 (1− 2ρ− λ2) θ + 2 (λ2 − 1) + ρ = 0.
Solve the equation. The local extreme point are θ′ = 1 or θ′′ = 2 (λ2 − 1) / (3ρ)+1/3.
If θ′′ > 1 such that λ2− 1 > ρ, ∆u
(
ρ, λ2, θ
′′)
= 4 (1 + ρ− λ2)3 / (27ρ2) < 0. No
agent expand without policy.
If θ′′ ≤ 1 such that λ2 − 1 ≤ ρ, ∆u
(
ρ, λ2, θ
′′)
= 4 (1 + ρ− λ2)3 / (27ρ2) > 0.
There exist agents who expand without policy.
Now we find θ with condition λ2 − 1 ≤ ρ.
When ρ = 0, the solution for ∆u
(
ρ, λ2, θ
′′)
= 0 is θ = 1. There is no adoption
when ρ = 0.
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When 0 < ρ < 1, the transition point satisfies ∆u = 0 which results in:
θ =

1
1
2ρ
√
(ρ+ λ2 − 1)2 − 4ρ (λ2 − 1) + λ22ρ + 12 − 12ρ
− 1
2ρ
√
(ρ+ λ2 − 1)2 − 4ρ (λ2 − 1) + λ22ρ + 12 − 12ρ
.
Therefore, we have θ equals to the third expression above:
θ = − 1
2ρ
√
(ρ+ λ2 − 1)2 − 4ρ (λ2 − 1) + λ2
2ρ
+
1
2
− 1
2ρ
,
since the third term is smaller than the second term and it is larger than 0.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.3. For the political payoff dominant equilibria, the agent chooses
to expand the cultural knowledge spectrum to 1 if ∆u (si = τ) is equal to ∆u (si = 1).
Therefore,
[
1− ρθ2 − (1− ρ) θ] (1− τ)− λ2 + (2λ2τ − λ2τ 2) = 0.
As the difference of cost between τ and 1 and the difference between marginal
utilities of interacting from expanding between τ and 1 is the same for every agent, the
agent with the lowest type 0 have the highest utilities of interacting from expanding
for every τ . Therefore, we set θ = 0. We have τ = 1− 1/λ2. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.8. When λ2 − ρ > 1 and τ < (λ2 − 1) /λ2, the social
welfare function is present as follows:
W (ρ, τ) =
[
1
3
+
1
6
ρ+
1
30
ρ2 + τ 2 (1− ρ) + τ 3
(
−1
3
+
4
3
ρ− 1
3
ρ2
)]
+
[
τ 4
(
−1
2
ρ+
1
2
ρ2
)
− 1
5
ρ2τ 5
]
− λ2
[
−1
2
ρτ 4 − 2
3
(1− 2ρ) τ 3 + (1− ρ) τ 2
]
.
F.O.C of W w.r.t. τ is:
−ρ2τ
(
τ − 1 + 1
ρ
)[
ρτ 2 + (1− ρ− 2λ2) τ + 2λ2 − 2
]
= 0.
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If ρ = 0,
τρ=0 =
 02 (λ2 − 1) / (2λ2 − 1) .
Then, social welfare W decreases in [0, 2 (λ2 − 1) / (2λ2 − 1)], and it increases in
[2 (λ2 − 1) / (2λ2 − 1) , 1]. Then, the optimum level is either at τ = 0 or at τ = 1.
We have:
W (ρ, 1)−W (ρ, 0) = 1− λ2
6
(2− ρ)− 1
3
+
ρ
6
+
ρ2
30
We have:
(i) if λ2 ≤ (20 + 5ρ+ ρ2) / (10− 5ρ), τ ∗ = 1;
(ii) if λ2 > (20 + 5ρ+ ρ2) / (10− 5ρ), τ ∗ = 0.
When ρ ∈ (0, 1], we have
τρ =

1− 1/ρ
−
√
(ρ− 2λ2 + 1)2 + 4ρ/ (2ρ) + 1/2 + λ2/ρ− 1/ (2ρ)√
(ρ− 2λ2 + 1)2 + 4ρ/ (2ρ) + 1/2 + λ2/ρ− 1/ (2ρ) .
.
In
[
0, τ 2ρ
]
, W is decreasing; in
[
τ 2ρ , 1
]
, W is increasing. Then, the optimum level is
either at τ = 0 or at τ = 1. The threshold to choose to level 1 or 0 is the same as the
case where ρ = 0.
When λ2− ρ < 1, we assume the social welfare is W ′ . When τ < 1− 1/λ2, W ′ is
fixed. Therefore, the derivative of social welfare is the same as the case of λ2− ρ > 0.
Therefore, the policy depends on W (ρ, 1) − W (ρ, 0). As λ2 < ρ + 1 < 2 + ρ <
(20 + 5ρ+ ρ2) / (10− 5ρ). For all λ2 − ρ < 1, τ ∗ > 1− 1/λ2. Q.E.D.
2.7.2 Supplements for Section 2.5.4
There are four types of political payoff dominant equilibria with U-shaped marginal
costs.
(i) if the cost is high enough, the policy drives only the agents whose born types are
below the policy level to expand;
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(ii) if agent 0 expands without policy, the policy plays the same role in determining
the shape of equilibria for the case with strictly increasing marginal costs;
(iii) if there is no agent expanding her/his cultural knowledge spectrum and the cost
is not high, then if the policy variable τ is either high (τ > mcu−1 (1)) or low, the
policy drives the agents whose born types are below the policy level to expand;
if the policy level is at middle levels, the policy drives the agents to expand to
mcu−1 (1);
(iv) if the born types of the expanding agents with lowest born types are not 0, the
policy variable plays the same role as it is in the third case. However, due to the
expanding without policy, the presentation is different.
We start from the simplest case: if λ1λ2 > λ1 + λ2 such that mcu (θ∗) > 1, no
agent expands in equilibrium without policy, and no agent chooses a level higher than
τ unless their born types are higher than τ . Therefore, if the marginal cost function is
mcu (θ) = (λ1 + λ2) θ
2− 2λ2θ+λ2 and λ1λ2 > λ1 +λ2, in political payoff dominant
equilibrium:
s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
0 ≤ θ < τ
τ ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
For the second case, if λ1λ2 ≤ λ1+λ2 and θ = 0, τ ’s impact on strategy of political
payoff dominant equilibrium is the same as that of the game with strictly increasing
marginal cost functions such that:
(i) if τ < mcu−1 (1), then:
s∗ (θ, τ) =
 mc
u−1 (1)
θ
0 ≤ θ < mcu−1 (1)
mcu
−1 (1) ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
(ii) if τ ≥ mcu−1 (1), then:
s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
0 ≤ θ < τ
τ ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
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If mcu (θ∗) ≤ 1, θ > 0 and τ ∈ (0, λ2/ (λ1 + λ2)], agents’ utilities derived from
expanding to τ may equal to the utilities from choosing their local extremes at [θ∗, 1].
For all τ ∈ (0, λ2/ (λ1 + λ2)], ∆u (θ, τ) decreases with θ in [0, θ].18 It means that
only ∆u (0, τ) needs to be checked. If there exists a τ ∈ (0, λ2/ (λ1 + λ2)] such that
∆u (0, τ) ≥ 0, the agents whose born types are below or equal to mcu−1 (1− F (0))
choose mcu−1 (1− F (0)); if for all τ ∈ (0, λ2/ (λ1 + λ2)] such that ∆u (0, τ) < 0,
the agents whose born types are at [0, τ ] choose τ and the other agents choose the same
as they do in payoff dominant equilibrium.
For further analysis of the third and the fourth cases, we firstly show the conformity
of expansion level with policy:
Corollary 2.8.1. If there exists a θi < ai < 1 such that s∗ (θi, τ) = ai in the unique
political payoff dominant equilibrium, then for all θ ∈ [θi, ai], s∗ (θ, τ) = a.
We use θt to denote the transition point for agent 0 to choose mcu
−1 (1− F (0))
such thatmcu−1 (1)−θt =
∫ mcu−1(1)
θt
mcu (θ) dθ such that θt ∈ (0, θ∗), sincemcu−1 (1)−
0 <
∫ mcu−1(1)
0
mcu (θ) dθ, if θ > 0; mcu−1 (1) − θ∗ > ∫ mcu−1(1)
θ∗ mc
u (θ) dθ holds for
all mcu (θ∗) ≤ 1. Then, given any τ ∈
(
θt,mc
u−1 (1)
)
, the equilibrium strategy is
the same as that with τ ∗ = θt does. When τ ∈
[
mcu
−1 (1) , 1
]
, the agents with born
types smaller than τ choose τ and the other agents stay with their born types. Note
that if Θ 6= ∅ and θ < θ∗, then min (Θ) = θ > θt. Otherwise, consider a τ ∈ (θ, θt);
s∗ (θ, τ) = τ and for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], s∗ (θ, τ) = θ, which contradicts Corollary 2.8.1.
If the marginal cost function ismcu (θ) = (λ1 + λ2) θ2−2λ2θ+λ2, λ1λ2 ≤ λ1+λ2
and Θ = ∅, in political payoff dominant equilibrium:
(i) if τ < θt and τ > mcu
−1 (1), then s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
0 ≤ θ < τ
τ ≤ θ ≤ 1
;
(ii) if θt < τ < mcu
−1 (1), then s∗ (θ, τ) =
 mc
u−1 (1)
θ
0 ≤ θ < mcu−1 (1)
mcu
−1 (1) ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
18 We prove ∂∆u (0, τ) /∂θ < 0. We have ∆u (θ, τ) expressed in with U-shaped homoge-
neous marginal cost function mcu (θ) as: ∆u (θ, τ) = [1− F (θ)]
[
mcu
−1 (1− F (θ))− τ
]
−∫mcu−1(1−F (θ))
τ
mcu (θ) dθ. The partial derivative of ∆u (0, τ) w.r.t θ is: ∂∆u (0, τ) /∂θ =
−F ′ (θ)
[
mcu
−1 (1− F (θ))− τ
]
. As τ ∈ [0, λ2/ (λ1 + λ2)] and mcu−1 (1− F (θ)) ∈[
λ2/ (λ1 + λ2) ,mc
u−1 (1)
]
, ∂∆u (0, τ) /∂θ < 0.
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Lastly, if the marginal cost function ismcu (θ) = (λ1 + λ2) θ2−2λ2θ+λ2, λ1λ2 ≤
λ1 + λ2 and Θ 6= ∅, in political payoff dominant equilibrium:
(i) if τ < θt, then s∗ (θ, τ) =

τ
θ
θ
θ
0 ≤ θ < τ
τ ≤ θ ≤ θ
θ ≤ θ < θ
θ < θ ≤ 1
;
(ii) if θt < τ < mcu
−1 (1), then s∗ (θ, τ) =
 mc
u−1 (1)
θ
0 ≤ θ < mcu−1 (1)
mcu
−1 (1) ≤ θ ≤ 1
;
(iii) if τ > mcu−1 (1), then s∗ (θ, τ) =
 τθ
0 ≤ θ < τ
τ ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
Chapter 3
The Acculturation Game: Density Effects under Hetero-
geneous Marginal Learning Costs
3.1 Introduction
In the process of acculturation, individuals from minority groups constantly exert ef-
forts to explore host countries and to learn the host countries’ cultural knowledge.
Both ethnic densities at individuals’ living areas and the similarities between individ-
uals’ culture of origins and that of host country have impacts on their learning process
and the acculturation outcomes.
For an individual who is from a cultural background which is more similar to the
host country’s culture, she/he can gain the resource of learning the cultural knowledge
more easily. The advantage of gaining the resource of learning comes from the en-
dowed social network, which can provide more relevant information of cultural learn-
ing. Studies suggest that the difficulty to learn the host country’s culture is less for an
individual, if her/his original cultural background is more similar to the host country’s
(Furnham and Bochner (1982) and Ward et al. (2001)).
The frequency of intercultural contacts with people from the host country’s cultural
background improves the acculturation outcome (Cle´ment and Kruidenier (1985)).
Therefore, the ethnic densities at individuals’ living areas could be a key factor de-
termining the acculturation outcomes. If the ethnic densities of the individuals’ ori-
gins are high at their living areas, the individuals have higher chances to meet the
individuals who are from the same ethnicity, which could substitutes the time and op-
portunities to explore the new host environment and interact with the natives. From
another perspective, the low density of native individuals results in the low incentives
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of individuals from minority groups to acquire cultural knowledge. This is due to
that the chances of coordinating with natives are low such that the benefits of cultural
learning are less than the costs of that.
In Chapter 2, we study the acculturation game and shows that the shape of accultur-
ative outcomes in equilibrium depends on the shape of marginal cost function (strictly
increasing, strictly decreasing or U-shaped). The limitation of the model is that it does
not capture the heterogeneity of the marginal costs with respect to agents’ born types.
We extend acculturation game model in Chapter 2 by considering the heteroge-
neous marginal cost. The marginal cost to gain new cultural knowledge increases with
the distance between the cultural knowledge at certain levels and agents’ born cultural
knowledge levels. We are interested in how the density distribution and heterogeneous
marginal costs will affect the shape of equilibrium. We are also interested in the impact
of the shapes of equilibrium strategy on the social welfare increasing from adaptation,
which is the difference between the social welfare in equilibrium and the endowed
social welfare.
The result shows that if the population density distribution is “flat” such that it is
below some thresholds, the equilibrium strategy of every agent is strictly increasing
with her/his born cultural knowledge level; if the population density function peaks
at some intervals such that it is above the thresholds, there exists the conformity of
expansion level of the agents whose born cultural knowledge levels are on the intervals
and the right neighbourhood of these intervals. The thresholds are determined by
the marginal cost function and the population cumulative distribution function over
agents’ cultural knowledge levels.
For the social welfare from adaptation, if the equilibrium strategy is strictly in-
creasing, the social welfare from adaptation is independent of the density distributions
over the cultural knowledge levels. The conformity of equilibrium strategy does not
necessarily cause gains or loss of social welfare from adaptation. We show with an
example that the social welfare from adaptation decreases with the density distribution
over the agents endowed with high levels of cultural knowledge.
There is little empirical literature we could find studying the ethnic density’s effects
on the individuals’ acculturation outcome.1
1Social psychology literature focuses on the ethnic density effect on the mental health of immigrants
(Murphy (1977), Faris and Dunham (1939) and Mintz and Schwartz (1964)). Sociological studies by
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A strand of empirical economic literature relevant to ethnic density focusing on
the ethnic densities’ effect on school segregation (Orfield (1983) and Echenique et al.
(2006)). Echenique et al. (2006) shows that school segregation is not linear in the ratio
of students from minority groups, which contradicts the prediction of Orfield (1983).
Echenique et al. (2006) also shows that school segregation (low interracial friendship
rate) has negative effects on Hispanics and African Americans, however, it has no
effects on Asians.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature of behavior assimilation by show
that the level of behavior assimilation depending on the population density distribu-
tion. Theoretical economic studies on evolution of convention specify the process of
matching and take an interest in its effects on the economic and evolutionary outcome.
For the uniform matching process, Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993) shows that
the evolutionary outcome is history dependent if agents’ action is with noise or muta-
tion. For the matching process in which agents have higher probabilities to meet their
neighbours, Ellison (1993) show the agents converge to the risk dominant equilibrium.
In network economic literature, Golub and Jackson (2012) shows that it takes more
time to reach opinion consensus if the density of links within groups are higher than
that between groups. We shows that with heterogeneous marginal cost of learning, the
high density of population of types prevents a high level of behavioral assimilation.
The remainder of this chapter is unfolded as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
model. Section 3.3 shows the shape of payoff dominant equilibria under density distri-
bution functions over the cultural knowledge spectrum. Section 3.4 analyzes the social
welfare from adaptation. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model with Heterogeneous Marginal Costs
Consider a set of agents N in a society. For agent i ∈ N , she/he is born with a
type θi ∈ Θ where Θ = {θ | 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1} is the cultural knowledge spectrum of the
society; and [0, θi] is the endowed cultural knowledge spectrum of agent i. Agent
i’s born type θi is independently and identically distributed on Θ. The cumulative
population distribution function w.r.t agents’ born types is continuous and defined as
Zhou (1997) and Portes and Zhou (2012) investigate the segmented assimilations of different ethnic
groups in the United States. However, they do not provide any information about how the sizes of
ethnic groups affect the acculturation outcome.
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F (θ) :=
∫ θ
0
f(x)dx in which f : Θ→ R+ is population density distribution function.
Density distribution function f is right continuous, such that for all θ ∈ [0, 1] such
that limx→θ+ f (x) = f (θ). The cumulative distribution function F (θ) is common
knowledge in the game.
Agent i’s action set isA (θi) = {ai | θi ≤ ai ≤ 1}. Agent i expands her/his cultural
knowledge spectrum from [0, θi] to [0, ai], if ai > θi; otherwise, agent i stays with
her/his born cultural spectrum. In the game, agent i meets a fixed number of other
agents who are independently drawn from F . The utilities agent i derives, when she/he
meets agent j, are the length of the cultural knowledge spectrum they have in common,
which is min (ai, aj).
The cost to choose ai is
C (ai, θi) = c (ai − θi)
in which c : [0, 1] → R+ and c (·) is strictly increasing and twice-differentiable. Con-
sider the marginal cost function such that ∂C (ai, θi) /∂ai = ∂c (ai − θi) /∂ai. Thus,
the marginal cost for agent i to acquire knowledge level ai is the distance from θi to
ai. The marginal cost is a function of the difference between the action agents choose
and their born types, which implies that the learning opportunities and resources are
easier to get for the agents with higher born types in acquiring cultural knowledge on
a certain interval of the spectrum.
We normalize the number of agents with whom agent i meets. Given a profile of
actions of agents excluding i denoted as a−i ∈ ×j∈N\{i}A (θj), the utilities agent i
deriving by choosing ai are the difference between expected payoff of interacting with
other agents Ea−i (min {ai, a−i}) and cost C (ai, θi). Agent i’s utility function is:
u (ai, θi, a−i) := Ea−i (min {ai, a−i})− C (ai, θi) . (3.1)
We focus on pure strategy symmetric Bayesian equilibrium. Then, the strategy
could be present as s : Θ → A (Θ) such that s is a mapping from agent i’s born type
θi to i’s action set A (θi) = {si | θi ≤ si ≤ 1}. Therefore, we can rewrite eq. (3.1) as:
u (si, θi, s, f) =
∫ 1
0
min (si, s (θ)) f (θ) dθ − C (si, θi) . (3.2)
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We use ui to denote user i’s utility function interchangeably with u (·, θi, s, f) in the
following discussion.
The symmetric Bayesian equilibrium results in multiple solutions in many cases
of the acculturation game.2 We focus on payoff dominant equilibrium, which has a
unique solution for the game.
The definition of payoff dominate equilibrium is as follows:
Definition 3.1. A strategy s∗ comprises a payoff dominant equilibrium, if s∗ is Pareto
superior to all other symmetric equilibria. That is, s∗ is a payoff dominant equilibrium,
if the following conditions hold:
(i) s∗ ∈ S in which S =
{
s ∈ A (Θ)Θ | ∀i, s (θi) = arg maxsi∈A(θi) u (si, θi, s, f)
}
;
(ii) ∀s ∈ S\{s∗} and ∀θi, u (θi, s∗, f) ≥ u (θi, s, f), and ∃θi such that u (θi, s∗, f) >
u (θi, s, f).
Set S contains all symmetric equilibria. Every agent’s expected utilities in equilib-
rium s∗ are at least as much as hers/his in the other symmetric equilibria, and at least
one agent is strictly better off in equilibrium s∗.
Before we discuss how the density distribution function f (·) affects the shape
of equilibrium. We first show that the nondecreasing of equilibrium strategy of the
acculturation game with heterogeneous marginal cost.
As shown in the following proposition, the nondecreasing of equilibrium strategy
in the acculturation game with homogeneous marginal cost in Chapter 2 still holds for
the acculturation game with cost function c (ai − θi).
Proposition 3.1. In the acculturation game with cost function c (ai − θi), payoff dom-
inant equilibrium strategy s∗ (θi) is a nondecreasing function of θi.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1. Given a strategy s∗ (·) played by other agents, for any
two agents i and j, the marginal utilities from
∫ 1
0
min (si, s
∗ (θ)) dF (θ) is the same.
Combined with that the marginal cost decreases with agents’ born types, the marginal
utilities to expand to a certain level for agents are increasing with their born types.
For any two agents θi < θj , (i) if agent θi expands to a level ai ∈ (θj, 1], agent θj
expands at least at ai by the increasing of marginal utilities with agents’ born types;
2For examples to illustrate the multiplicity of symmetric equilibria, please see Example 3.1 in Sec-
tion 3.3 and notes for Footnote 3 in Section 3.6.
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(ii) it is possible that agent θi expands to a level lower than or equal to θj , or stay with
born type θi, if the total cost of expanding to a > θj is too high to be covered by the
increment of interacting utilities. Therefore, we have Proposition 3.1. Q.E.D.
3.3 Shapes of Equilibria
In the acculturation game of Chapter 2, if agent θi expand to ai > θi, then all the
agents with born types in [θi, ai] conform to expand to ai. Although the nondecreasing
of equilibrium strategy still holds in the acculturation game with heterogeneous cost
(Proposition 3.1), the condition for agents to expand and that for the conformity of
expansion level is different from Chapter 2. We use the following example to show.
Example 3.1 Consider the cost function is in a quadratic form, such that c (ai − θi) =
3 (ai − θi)2 /5. We have well-defined utility function presented as follows:
U (si, θi) =
∫ 1
0
f (θ) min (si, s (θ)) dθ − 3
5
(si − θi)2 .
Consider two different density distribution functions f 1 (·) and f 2 (·):
f 1 (θ) =
 0.901.05
0 ≤ θ < 1/3
1/3 ≤ θ ≤ 1
and
f 2 (θ) =

0.90
1.50
0.60
0 ≤ θ < 1/3
1/3 ≤ θ < 2/3
2/3 ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
f 1 and f 2 have the same density distribution on interval [0, 1/3]. For interval
[1/3, 1], f 1 is constant; however, f 2 is peak at interval [1/3, 2/3] and then drops to
0.6 at interval [2/3, 1], which is shown at the left diagram of Figure 3.1.
The right diagram of Figure 3.1 shows the equilibrium strategy for f 1 and f 2 re-
spectively. To be more specific:
In the payoff dominant equilibrium with f 1 denoted by black line in Figure 3.1,
the equilibrium strategy s∗1 (·)is:
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s∗1 (θi) =

5
6
+ 1
4
θi
7
8
+ 1
8
θi
0 ≤ θ < 1/3
1/3 ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
The equilibrium strategy with f 2 denoted by red line in Figure 3.1 is present as
follows:
s∗2 (θi) =

5
6
+ 1
4
θi
11
12
1
2
θi +
1
2
0 ≤ θ < 1/3
1/3 ≤ θ < 5/6
5/6 ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
There is a kink at 1/3 in both cases. However, for s∗ with f 1 , it increases at interval
[1/3, 1]; for s∗ with f 2, it keeps constant at interval [1/3, 5/6] and then increases to
1. Note that that the set of agents’ born type who choose the constant expansion level
11/12 not just includes the agents with born types at the peak interval [1/3, 2/3] but
also includes its right neighbourhood [2/3, 5/6].
Figure 3.1 Density distributions and Equilibrium strategies of Example 3.1.
The intuition is as follows: we reorganize the utility eq. (3.2) as follows by the
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nondecreasing of equilibrium strategy:
u (s∗i , s, θi) =
the least motivation to expand︷ ︸︸ ︷
s∗i [1− F (θi)] +
∫ θi
0
s∗ (θ) dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utilities of interacting
−3
5
(s∗i − θi) . (3.3)
The least marginal motivation to expand results in F.O.C:
1− F (θi) = 6
5
(si − θi) .
Solve the F.O.C. of the utility function, we have s (θ) = θi + 5 [F (1)− F (θi)] /6. If
for all θi, f (θi) ≤ 6/5 and ∀θ′i ∈ (0, 1) such that f (θ′i) = 6/5, (θ′i, s (θ′i)) is a saddle
point, then s(θi) is a strictly increasing function, which is the case for f 1; however, if
there exists a pair θ′, θ′′ < 1 such that for all θ ∈ (θ′, θ′′), f (θ) > 6/5, then s∗ (·) is a
decreasing function. We combine with the nondecreasing of the equilibrium strategy,
we have the strategy denoted as:
s∗(θi) = min
{
1, max
θ∈[0,θi]
(
θ +
5
6
(F (1)− F (θ))
)}
. (3.4)
which is the case for f 2 such that agents with born types in [1/3, 5/6] expand to 11/12.
The intuition for the differences in equilibria of the two cases is that the density
distribution peak at interval [1/3, 2/3] of f 2 results in no incentives of agents with
born types in [1/3, 5/6] to expand from the low population distribution of agents with
high born types; therefore, they conform with the cultural knowledge expansion level
of agent with born type 1/3. 3
Now we derive the condition for different shapes of equilibria under convex cost
function c (·).
We use mc (·) to denote the first derivative of the cost function c (·) . If c (·) is
convex and mc (·) is strictly increasing, then we use mc−1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1]to denote
the inverse function of mc (·), and mc′ (·) to denote the second derivative of c (·).
The following proposition shows how population density function affects the shape
of equilibrium strategy.
3For readers who have interests about the multiplicities of symmetric equilibrium in this case, please
see Section 3.6.
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Proposition 3.2. In the acculturation game with cost function c (ai − θi) such that
c (·) is convex,
(i) if for all θ in [0, 1], f (θ) ≤ mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))), and for all θ′i in (0, 1) such
that f (θ′i) = mc
′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))), (θ′i, s (θ′i)) is a saddle point, then s∗ (θi)
is a strictly increasing function of θi and is given by
s∗ (θ) = θ +mc−1 (1− F (θ)) ;
(ii) if there exists θ′ < θ′′ in (0, 1) such that for all θ in [θ′, θ′′], the density distribu-
tion function satisfies f (θ) ≥ mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))), then there exist θ′′′ > θ′′
such that for all θi ∈ [θ′, θ′′′], s∗ (θ) is constant. The equilibrium strategy is :
s∗ (θ) = min
{
1, max
θ′∈[0,θ]
θ′ +mc−1 (1− F (θ′))
}
.
For the details of proof, please see Section 3.6.
The conformity of expansion level happens where density distribution at a interval
is higher than the threshold mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))). The threshold is a nondecreasing
function of θ: the high population density at higher level is with more or with equal
probability to cause the conformity of expansion level.
Although the shape of equilibrium is different, the characterization of equilibrium
strategy for general costs will be not very different from that in Chapter 2.
We use set A∗ (θi) to collect all the possible choices of i, such that:
A∗ (θi) := {a ∈ [θi, 1] | mc (a− θi) = 1− F (θi) or a ∈ {θi, 1}} .
We use function ∆u (θi) to represent the largest non-negative utility difference of i
between choosing from A∗ (θi) and staying with her/his born type. Then:
∆u (θi) := max
a∈A∗(θi)
u (a, s, θi)−u (θi, s, θi) = max
a∈A∗(θi)
[1− F (θi)] (a− θi)−c (a− θi) .
Furthermore, we define a function smax (θi) = max arg ∆u (θi) to pick the maximal
level among all utility maximization levels of agent θi.
Combined with the cases where there exists an agent with born type smaller than
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θi choose a level higher than θi, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique payoff dominant equilibrium and the equilib-
rium strategy is s∗ (θi) = maxθ∈[0,θi] s
max (θ) for all θi in [0, 1].
For the uniqueness of payoff dominant equilibrium, please see Section 2.7.1.
3.4 Social Welfare From Adaptation
As readers might notice, agents, except for the agents with type 0, can gains utilities
without expanding their knowledge spectrum. The utilities come from their endowed
knowledge levels. A question raises: does ex-post social welfare mainly come from
the endowed social welfare or the social welfare from adaption gained by expanding
the cultural knowledge spectrum? In this section, we formally define the social wel-
fare from adaptation; then, we show that the social welfare is constant for all density
distribution function if the equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing. Further, we use
example to show the conformity of expanding does not necessarily cause gains or loss
compared to the constant social welfare from adaption; and we also show with an ex-
ample that the social welfare from adaptation decreases with the density distribution
of agents born in the high knowledge levels.
The adaptive social welfare is defined as the integral of utility differences of all
agents between the social welfare after adaption and the social welfare with assump-
tion that no agent expanding their cultural knowledge spectrum:
∆SW (f) =
∫ 1
0
u (s∗, θ)− u (θ, θ) dF (θ) .
The following proposition states the constant social welfare from adaptation for all
increasing expanding strategies in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4. Given a cost function c (·), the adaptive social welfare ∆SW is con-
stant for all equilibria with strictly increasing equilibrium strategies.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.4. We just need to show for any increasing function g :
[0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that s∗ (θ) = θ + g (1− F (θ)), ∆SW is constant.
3.4. Social Welfare From Adaptation 96
For every agent θ′, the welfare is:
u (s∗ (θ′) , θ)−u (θ′, θ) =
∫ 1
0
[min (s∗ (θ′) , s∗ (θ))−min (θ′, θ)] dF (θ)−c (s∗ (θ)− θ)
Replace s∗ (θ) with θ + g (1− F (θ)), we have:
u (s∗ (θ′) , θ)− u (θ′, θ) =∫ θ′
0
g (1− F (θ)) dF (θ) + g (1− F (θ′)) (1− F (θ′))− c (g (1− F (θ′))) .
Therefore,
∆SW =∫ 1
0
∫ θ′
0
g (1− F (θ)) dF (θ) + g (1− F (θ′)) (1− F (θ′))− c (g (1− F (θ′))) dF (θ′) .
Therefore, ∆SW is constant given c, as every item in the integral is a function of
F (θ′) and the integral is on a fixed interval. Q.E.D.
The intuition is that the utilities from adaptation for all agents is a function of their
accumulative distribution function F (·) if the strategy is strictly increasing. Therefore,
as the integral is dF (θ) and on fixed interval [0, 1], the density effects on social welfare
is canceled out.
For the cases where there exists the conformity of expansion level, the adaptive
social welfare could be more than the constant ∆SW with strictly increasing equi-
librium strategy; however, it could be also lower than the constant ∆SW depending
on the distribution function. Consider distribution function f 3 as follows in the same
setting of Example 3.1:
f 3 (θ) =
 0.61.8
0 ≤ θ < 2/3
2/3 ≤ θ ≤ 1
.
At interval [0, 2/3] the density is low and constant at 0.6, and then the density peaks
at interval [2/3, 1] and is equal to 1.8.
The approximate numbers of social welfare from adaptation for the three cases are
0.56, 0.57, and 0.49 for f 1, f 2 and f 3 respectively. Both equilibrium strategies with
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f 2 and f 3 have the conformity of behavior; however, ∆SW (f 2) > ∆SW (f 1), but
∆SW (f 3) < ∆SW (f 1).
We give a simple example to show how the social welfare from adaptation depends
on the density distribution function:
Example 3.2 We consider population density distribution f (θ) = 2ρθ + 1 − ρ such
that ∀ρ ∈ [0, 1], F (1) = ∫ 1
0
(2ρθ + 1− ρ) dθ ≡ 1. If ρ = 0, f (θ) follows a uniform
distribution; if ρ = 1, f (θ) = 2θ. The higher ρ is, the steeper the density distribution
is. The cost function is quadratic with β = 1, then the utility function is as follows:
u (si, θi) =
∫ 1
0
f (θ) min (si, s (θ)) dθ − 1
2
(si − θi)2 . (3.5)
Therefore, we have: given the density distribution function as f (θ) = 2ρθ + 1 −
ρ and utility function as eq. (3.5), the adaptive social welfare ∆SW (ρ) is strictly
decreasing with ρ. The calculation is shown below.
The threshold for the conformity of expansion level with eq. (3.5) is 1. By the
increasing of f (·), if f (θ′) = 1, then for all θ > θ′, s∗ (θ) = 1. With 2ρθ′+ 1−ρ = 1,
we have θ′ = 1/2 whatever ρ is in this case. Therefore, the social welfare function is
denoted as follows:
∆SW (ρ) =∫ 1
2
0
(∫ θi
0
1− F (θ) dF (θ) + (1− F (θi))2 − 1
2
(1− F (θi))2
)
dF (θi)
+
∫ 1
1
2
(∫ 1
2
0
1− F (θ) dF (θ) + (1− θi) (1− F (θi))− 1
2
(1− θi)2
)
dF (θi)
=
11
24
− 1
16
ρ− 19
480
ρ2 − 1
128
ρ3.
From the equation showed above, ∆SW (θ) is a strictly decreasing function of ρ.
3.5 Conclusion
We study the acculturation game with heterogeneous marginal cost, which is increas-
ing with the distances between the level of cultural knowledge agents acquire and their
born cultural knowledge levels.
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We show that the density distribution function over the cultural knowledge lev-
els play a key role in determining the shape of equilibrium strategy. If the density
distribution is below some thresholds, the equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing;
otherwise, the equilibrium strategy for agents at the peak interval and its right neigh-
bourhood conforms to the same level. The thresholds are determined by the marginal
cost function and the population cumulative distribution function over agents’ cultural
knowledge levels.
For social welfare analysis, we show for all equilibrium which is strictly increas-
ing, the social welfare from adaptation is constant under any distribution function.
However, the conformity of equilibrium strategy does not necessarily cause gains and
loss of the social welfare from adaptation. We further show that the social welfare is
decreasing with density distribution at high levels of cultural knowledge.
At this stage, the acculturation game model oversimplifies the learning in the pro-
cess of intercultural contact and the matching process of interacting agents. Future
researches could be thought of to studies the effects of them. Moreover, empirical
studies could be considered to exam the validity of the mechanism proposed by the
acculturation game.
3.6 Appendix
NOTES FOR FOOTNOTE 3. There exists multiple symmetric equilibria for the cases
with f 2. The symmetric equilibrium is denoted by:
s (θi) =

5
6
+ 1
4
θi
5
6
+ 1
4
θ
1
2
θi +
1
2
0 ≤ θ < θ
θ ≤ θ < 2
3
+ 1
2
θ
2
3
+ 1
2
θ ≤ θ ≤ 1
in which θ ∈ [0, 1/3].
In the symmetric equilibrium, the expansion strategy of agents endowed with low
levels of cultural knowledge is strictly increasing with their born types; the agents
endowed with middle levels of cultural knowledge expand to the same level, and the
agent endowed with high cultural knowledge expand to a higher level and the expan-
sion strategy strictly increases with agents’ born types.
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Every agent’s utility increases with θ. Therefore, the payoff dominant equilibrium
s∗ is with θ = 1/3.
In symmetric equilibria, the set of agents choosing the conforming expansion level
contains either agents in the interval [0, 1/3] or agents born in interval [2/3, 1], or both.
The population of conformity reaches its infimum in payoff dominant equilibrium by
2/3 + θ/2 − θ = 2/3 − θ/2, and the population density function is lower in high
cultural knowledge levels than in the low cultural knowledge level. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2. The least marginal utility of agent i to expand is 1 −
F (θi) − mc (si − θi). If c (·) is convex, then the least expansion level for agent i is
si = θi +mc
−1 (1− F (θi)).
Consider the first statement. If for all θ ∈ [0, 1] f (θ) ≤ mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))),
and for all θ′i ∈ (0, 1) f (θ′i) = mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))) (θ′i, s (θ′i)) is a saddle point,
then s(θ) is strictly increasing. This is due to that the first derivatives of s (θ), ds/dθ =
1−f (θ) /mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))) ≥ 0 and any θ such that ds/dθ = 0 is a saddle point.
Therefore, the least marginal utility for every agent is also the the most marginal utility
for her/her. Therefore, we have s∗ (θ) = θ +mc−1 (1− F (θ)).
Consider the second statement. If there exists θi < θj ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
θ ∈ [θ′, θ′′], f (θ) ≥ mc′ (mc−1 (1− F (θ))), then s (θ) = θi + mc−1 (1− F (θi)) is
strictly decreasing at interval [θ′, θ′′]. Then, s (θ) begins to increase. Therefore, there
exists a θ′′′ > θ′′ such that s (θ′) = s (θ′′′). For agent not in [θ′, θ′′′], the expansion
strategy is given by s (θ); for agent in [θ′, θ′′′], their expansion strategy is the same
and equal to s (θ′) due to the nondecreasing of strategy (their motivation to expand
is higher than 1 − F (θ), since agents has low born types expand higher than s (θ)).
Combined with the expansion level bounded by 1, we have:
s∗ (θ) = min
{
1, max
θ′∈[0,θ]
θ′ +mc−1 (1− F (θ′))
}
;
Q.E.D.
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